思想对待客观性的第二种态度:经验主义，批判哲学

Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity

EMPIRICISM

§ 40. Experience affords the sole foundation, as knowledge of phenomena § 41. To test the value of the Categories (1) Kant examined how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to knowledge of truth (2) Kant viewed the categories to see whether they were subjective or objective § 42. The Theoretical Faculty (1) Kant holds that the Categories have their source in the Ego (2) Kant's meaning of the transcendental (3) The categories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us § 43. The Categories as Instrumentality or in Consciousness only n. It is not altogether wrong to call the categories empty, but the content is not foreign to them § 44. Incapable of Knowing Things-in-Themselves § 45. Reason discovers the conditioned nature of knowledge n. Kant was to first to signal the distinction between Reason and Understanding § 46. Seeking for knowledge of the Thing-in-itself § 47. The Soul n. The soul is much more than a simple or unchangeable sort of thing § 48. The World n. Metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief that contradictions were due to subjective mistake § 49. Reason § 50. To Begin with Being in its natural aspect § 51. To set out from the abstractum of Thought § 52. Can furnish only a criticism of knowledge, not a doctrine n. Reason is unconditioned only in so far as its character is due to a foreign content § 53. Practical Reason § 54. The Formalism of Practical Reason n. The free self-determination Kant denied to speculative he vindicated for practical philosophy § 55. The Reflective Power of Judgment § 56. Theoretical or Practical Reason § 57. Reflective Faculty of Judgment § 58. The relation between Means and Ends § 59. The final End is Realised in the World § 60. The Good is also our Good (1) Critical philosophy brought home the conviction that the categories are finite in their range (2) Fichte called attention to the want of a deduction of the categories

以下是黑格尔《小逻辑》第40-60节的核心要义解析，采用结构化的知识呈现方式：

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黑格尔对康德哲学的批判与发展框架

Ⅰ. 认识论基础（§40-44）

核心命题	康德立场	黑格尔批判
经验作为知识基础	现象知识来自感性直观与知性范畴综合	肯定经验起点但否定其终极性，强调辩证发展超越经验局限性
范畴检验	通过先验演绎验证范畴的客观有效性	指出康德的"主观性"陷阱：范畴沦为思维工具而非存在本身的规定性（§41-42）
先验自我根源	范畴源自纯粹统觉的"我思"	揭示隐含的二元论：将思维与存在割裂，导致"物自体"不可知论（§43）
范畴空洞性	范畴需感性材料填充	承认形式特征但强调范畴自身包含具体内容："逻辑理念在自身中具有无限质料"（§43n）

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Ⅱ. 理性批判（§45-52）

辩证结构演进：

康德突破 → 理性与知性区分（§45n）
  ↓
矛盾本质 → 非主观错误而是客观存在（§48n）
  ↓
方法论转向 → 从抽象存在出发的必然性（§50）
  ↓
体系重构 → 思维抽象到具体总体的运动（§51）

关键转折点：

• 物自体困境（§44,46）：揭示康德认识论的自我设限
• 灵魂观颠覆（§47）：否定简单实体说，指向精神的现象学展开
• 世界矛盾说（§48）：将二律背反转化为辩证法的动力机制

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Ⅲ. 实践哲学重构（§53-59）

双重维度批判：

graph TD
    A[实践理性] --> B[形式主义缺陷]
    A --> C[目的论重构]
    B --> D("道德律令缺乏具体内容")
    C --> E("内在目的论取代外在合目的性")
    E --> F("历史理性中实现终极目的")

突破性观点：

1. 自由意志的辩证定位（§54n）：在实践领域恢复被理论领域否定的自我决定权
2. 判断力升华（§55-57）：反思判断力作为联结理论/实践的枢纽
3. 目的论革命（§58-59）：手段与目的在历史进程中的辩证统一

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Ⅳ. 范畴体系的重建（§60）

对费希特启示的深化：

• 范畴演绎的缺失：康德未展示范畴的内在生成逻辑
• 黑格尔解决方案：
  • 通过"存在论-本质论-概念论"三阶段实现范畴自我推演
  • 建立"具体普遍性"取代抽象范畴排列
  • 在绝对理念中完成思维与存在的同一

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认识论范式转换图示

康德先验哲学 → 黑格尔思辨哲学
   │                    │
   ├─静态范畴表───────动态范畴体系
   ├─二元分立────────辩证统一
   ├─批判作为限制─────批判作为奠基
   └─理性谦抑────────理性绝对

延伸思考

1. 辩证法萌芽：这些章节预示《逻辑学》方法论雏形
2. 历史哲学伏笔：目的论讨论为"理性狡计"说奠基
3. 现代性启示：对工具理性的批判预见20世纪哲学议题

此部分构成黑格尔超越先验哲学的关键转折，为其绝对唯心主义体系建立认识论基础。建议对照《精神现象学》"意识"章节深化理解。

§ 37

Under these circumstances a double want began to be felt. Partly it was the need of a concrete subject-matter, as a counterpoise to the abstract theories of the understanding, which is unable to advance unaided from its generalities to specialisation and determination. Partly, too, it was the demand for something fixed and secure, so as to exclude the possibility of proving anything and everything in the sphere, and according to the method of the finite formulae of thought. Such was the genesis of Empirical philosophy, which abandons the search for truth in thought itself, and goes to fetch it from Experience, the outward and the inward present.

The rise of Empiricism is due to the need thus stated of concrete contents, and a firm footing — needs which the abstract metaphysic of the understanding failed to satisfy. Now by concreteness of contents it is meant that we must know the objects of consciousness as intrinsically determinate and as the unity of distinct characteristics. But, as we have already seen, this is by no means the case with the metaphysic of understanding, if it conform to its principle. With the mere understanding, thinking is limited to the form of an abstract universal, and can never advance to the particularisation of this universal. Thus we find the metaphysicians engaged in an attempt to elicit by the instrumentality of thought what was the essence or fundamental attribute of the Soul. The Soul, they said, is simple. The simplicity thus ascribed to the Soul meant a mere and utter simplicity, from which difference is excluded: difference, or in other words composition, being made the fundamental attribute of body, or of matter in general. Clearly, in simplicity of this narrow type we have a very shallow category, quite incapable of embracing the wealth of the soul or of the mind. When it thus appeared that abstract metaphysical thinking was inadequate, it was felt that resource must be had to empirical psychology. The same happened in the case of Rational Physics. The current phrases there were, for instance, that space is infinite, that Nature makes no leap, etc. Evidently this phraseology was wholly unsatisfactory in presence of the plenitude and life of nature.

§ 38

To some extent this source from which Empiricism draws is common to it with metaphysic. It is in our materialised conceptions, i.e. in facts which emanate, in the first instance, from experience, that metaphysic also finds the guarantee for the correctness of its definitions (including both its initial assumptions and its more detailed body of doctrine). But, on the other hand, it must be noted that the single sensation is not the same thing as experience, and that the Empirical School elevates the facts included under sensation, feeling, and perception into the form of general ideas propositions, or laws. This, however, it does with the reservation that these general principles (such as force) are to have no further import or validity of their own beyond that taken from the sense impression, and that no connection shall be deemed legitimate except what can be shown to exist in phenomena. And on the subjective side Empirical cognition has its stable footing in the fact that in a sensation consciousness is directly present and certain of itself.

In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle contradicts that ‘ought to be’ on the strength of which ‘reflection’ is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to a scene beyond a scene which is assumed to have place and being only in the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism, philosophy (§ 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the subjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of freedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is that man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact of knowledge which he has to accept.

When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences, Empiricism being in its facts limited to the finite sphere denies the supersensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would define its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and formal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, etc.; following the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and in so doing presupposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics in wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical.

From Empiricism came the cry: ‘Stop roaming in empty abstractions keep your eyes open, lay hold on man and nature as they are here before you, enjoy the present moment.’ Nobody can deny that there is a good deal of truth in these words. The everyday world, what is here and now was a good exchange for the futile other-world — for the mirages and the chimeras of the abstract understanding. And thus was acquired an infinite principle — that solid footing so much missed in the old metaphysic. Finite principles are the most that the understanding can pick out — and these being essentially unstable and tottering, the structure they supported must collapse with a crash. Always the instinct of reason was to find an infinite principle. As yet, the time had not come for finding it in thought. Hence, this instinct seized upon the present, the Here, the This — where doubtless there is implicit infinite form, but not in the genuine existence of that form. The external world is the truth, it if could but know it: for the truth is actual and must exist. The infinite principle, the self-centred truth, therefore, is in the world for reason to discover: though it exists in an individual and sensible shape, and not in its truth.

Besides, this school makes sense-perception the form in which fact is to be apprehended; and in this consists the defect of Empiricism. Sense perception as such is always individual, always transient: not indeed that the process of knowledge stops short at sensation: on the contrary, it proceeds to find out the universal and permanent element in the individual apprehended by sense. This is the process leading from simple perception to experience.

In order to form experiences, Empiricism makes especial use of the form of Analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to peel off one by one, like the skins of an onion. In thus dismembering the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. Empiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this change, the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our intention to comprehend. Mind itself is an inherent division. The error lies in forgetting that this is only one half of the process, and that the main point is the reunion of what has been parted. And it is where analysis never gets beyond the stage of partition that the words of the poet are true:

Encheiresin Naturae nennt’s die Chemie, Spottet ihrer selbat, und weiss nicht, wie: hat die Theile in ihrer Hand, Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.

Analysis starts from the concrete; and the possession of this material gives it a considerable advantage over the abstract thinking of the old metaphysics. It establishes the differences in things, and this is very important; but these very differences are nothing after all but abstract attributes, i.e. thoughts. These thoughts, it is assumed, contain the real essence of the objects; and thus once more we see the axiom of bygone metaphysics reappear, that the truth of things lies in thought.

Let us next compare the empirical theory with that of metaphysics in the matter of their respective contents. We find the latter, as already stated, taking for its theme the universal objects of the reason, viz. God, the Soul, and the World: and these themes, accepted from popular conception, it was the problem of philosophy to reduce into the form of thoughts. Another specimen of the same method was the Scholastic philosophy, the theme presupposed by which was formed by the dogmas of the Christian Church; and it aimed at fixing their meaning and giving them a systematic arrangement through thought. The facts on which Empiricism is based are of entirely different kind. They are the sensible facts of nature and the facts of the finite mind. In other words, Empiricism deals with a finite material, and the old metaphysicians had an infinite — though, let us add, they made this infinite content finite by the finite form of the understanding. The same finitude of form reappears in Empiricism — but here the facts are finite also. To this extent, then, both modes of philosophising have the same method; both proceed from data or assumptions, which they accept as ultimate.

Generally speaking, Empiricism finds the truth in the outward world, and even if it allow a supersensible world, it holds knowledge of that world to be impossible, and would restrict us to the province of sense-perception. This doctrine when systematically carried out produces what has been latterly termed Materialism. Materialism of this stamp looks upon matter, qua matter, as the genuine objective world. But with matter we are at once introduced to an abstraction, which as such cannot be perceived, and it may be maintained that there is no matter, because, as it exists, it is always something definite and concrete. Yet the abstraction we term matter is supposed to lie at the basis of the whole world of sense, and expresses the sense-world in its simplest terms as out-and-out individualisation, and hence a congeries of points in mutual exclusion. So long then as this sensible sphere is and continues to be for Empiricism a mere datum, we have a doctrine of bondage: for we become free, when we are confronted by no absolutely alien world, but depend upon a fact which we ourselves are. Consistently with the empirical point of view, besides, reason and unreason can only be subjective: in other words, we must take what is given just as it is, and we have no right to ask whether and to what extent it is rational in its own nature.

§ 39

Touching this principle it has been justly observed that in what we call Experience, as distinct from mere single perception of single facts, there are two elements. The one is the matter, infinite in its multiplicity, and as it stands a mere set of singulars: the other is the form, the characteristics of universality and necessity. Mere experience no doubt offers many, perhaps innumerable, cases of similar perceptions: but, after all, no multitude, however great, can be the same thing as universality. Similarly, mere experience affords perceptions of changes succeeding each other and of objects in juxtaposition; but it presents no necessary connection. If perception, therefore, is to maintain its claim to be the sole basis of what men hold for truth, universality and necessity appear something illegitimate: they become an accident of our minds, a mere custom, the content of which might be otherwise constituted than it is.

It is an important corollary of this theory, that on this empirical mode of treatment legal and ethical principles and laws, as well as the truths of religion, are exhibited as the work of chance, and stripped of their objective character and inner truth.

The scepticism of Hume, to which this conclusion was chiefly due, should be clearly marked off from Greek scepticism. Hume assumes the truth of the empirical element, feeling and sensation, and proceeds to challenge universal principles and laws, because they have no warranty from sense-perception. So far was ancient scepticism from making feeling and sensation the canon of truth, that it turned against the deliverances of sense first of all.

(On modern scepticism as compared with ancient, see Schelling and Hegel’s Critical Journal of Philosophy)

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

§ 40

In common with Empiricism, the Critical Philosophy assumes that experience affords the one sole foundation for cognitions; which however it does not allow to rank as truths, but only as knowledge of phenomena.

The Critical theory starts originally from the distinction of elements presented in the analysis of experience, viz. the matter of sense, and its universal relations. Taking into account Hume’s criticism on this distinction as given in the preceding section, viz. that sensation does not explicitly apprehend more than an individual or more than a mere event, it insists at the same time on the fact that universality and necessity are seen to perform a function equally essential in constituting what is called experience. This element, not being derived from the empirical facts as such, must belong to the spontaneity of thought; in other words, it is a priori. The Categories or Notions of the Understanding constitute the objectivity of experiential cognitions. In every case they involve a connective reference, and hence through their means are formed synthetic judgments a priori, that is, primary and underivative connections of opposites.

虽然批判哲学和经验论一样，都假定经验是知识的唯一基础，但前者并不认为这些知识是真理，而是仅仅把它们看作关于现象的知识。批判哲学的出发点在于通过分析经验而区分其中的两个要素：一个是感性材料，另一个是这些材料的普遍关联。因此它一方面同意上节所说的观点，即知觉本身仅仅包含着个别东西和个别事件，另一方面坚持这[113]样一个事实，即所谓的经验里面同样包含着普遍性和必然性等本质性规定。因为这个要素不是来源于经验本身，所以它属于思维的自发性，或者说是先天的。——各种思维规定或知性概念构成了经验知识的客观性。总的说来，它们包含着关联，因此是通过先天综合判断(亦即相互对立的东西之间的原初关联)而赋予自己这个形式。

Even Hume’s scepticism does not deny that the characteristics of universality and necessity are found in cognition. And even in Kant this fact remains a presupposition after all; it may be said, to use the ordinary phraseology of the sciences, that Kant did no more than offer another explanation of the fact.

[说明]知识包含着普遍性和必然性等规定，这是休谟的怀疑主义也不否认的一个事实。康德哲学同样把这个事实当作自己的前提。用通俗的科学语言来说，康德哲学只不过是对这个事实提出了另外一种解释。

§ 41

The Critical Philosophy proceeds to test the value of the categories employed in metaphysic, as well as in other sciences and in ordinary conception. This scrutiny however is not directed to the content of these categories, nor does it inquire into the exact relation they bear to one another: but simply considers them as affected by the contrast between subjective and objective. The contrast, as we are to understand it here, bears upon the distinction (see preceding §) of the two elements in experience. The name of objectivity is here given to the element of universality and necessity, i.e. to the categories themselves, or what is called the a priori constituent. The Critical Philosophy however widened the contrast in such a way, that the subjectivity comes to embrace the ensemble of experience, including both of the aforesaid elements; and nothing remains on the other side but the ‘thing-in-itself’.

批判哲学首先考察形而上学以及其他科学乃至日常表象使用的那些知性概念的价值。但这种批判并不讨论这些思维规定的内容及其相互之间的关系，而是一般地按照主观性和客观性的对立去考察它们。就当前的语境而言，这个对立又涉及经验内部的两个要素的区别(参阅前一节)。客观性在这里所指的是普遍性和必然性亦即思维规定本身这一要素，——或者说所谓的先天因素。但批判哲学扩大了这个对立，以至于全部经验(亦即那两个要素一起)都落入主观性，于是只剩下自在之物与主观性相对立。

The special forms of the a priori element, in other words, of thought, which in spite of its objectivity is looked upon as a purely subjective act, present themselves as follows in a systematic order which, it may be remarked, is solely based upon psychological and historical grounds.

先天因素亦即思维虽然具有客观性，但仍然被看作一种纯粹主观的[114]活动，而它的各种具体形式是通过一种体系化的方式得出的，但严格说来，这种体系化只不过是立足于一些心理学一历史学的基础。

(1) A very important step was undoubtedly made, when the terms of the old metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny. The plain thinker pursued his unsuspecting way in those categories which had offered themselves naturally. It never occurred to him to ask to what extent these categories had a value and authority of their own. If, as has been said, it is characteristic of free thought to allow no assumptions to pass unquestioned, the old metaphysicians were not free thinkers. They accepted their categories as they were, without further trouble, as an a priori datum, not yet tested by reflection.
The Critical philosophy reversed this.
Kant undertook to examine how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth. In particular he demanded a criticism of the faculty of cognition as preliminary to its exercise.
That is a fair demand, if it mean that even the forms of thought must be made an object of investigation. Unfortunately there soon creeps in the misconception of already knowing before you know
— the error of refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim.
True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a cognition?

So that what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. Hence they examine themselves: in their own action they must determine their limits, and point out their defects. This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is Immanent in their own action.

We may therefore state the first point in Kant’s philosophy as follows: Thought must itself investigate its own capacity of knowledge. People in the present day have got over Kant and his philosophy: everybody wants to get further. But there are two ways of going further — a backward and a forward. The light of criticism soon shows that many of our modern essays in philosophy are mere repetitions of the old metaphysical method, an endless and uncritical thinking in a groove determined by the natural bent of each man’s mind.

[附释1]对旧的形而上学的各种规定加以考察，这无疑已经是一个极为重要的进步。朴素的意识心安理得地徜徉于各种信手拈来的规定，却从来没有考虑过这些规定本身在何等限度内才具有价值和效用。此前我们已经指出，自由的思维是一种没有任何前提的思维。旧的形而上学的思维之所以不是自由的思维，就是因为它在未经反思的情况下不由分说地把那些规定当作预先存在着的先天因素。 反之批判哲学给自己下达了一个任务， 去考察思维的形式究竟在多大程度上能够帮助我们认识真理。 确切地说，应当在从事认识活动之前先考察认识能力。 诚然，这个要求有其正确之处， 即思维本身的形式必须成为认识活动的对象； 但它很快引起一种误解，仿佛人们在从事认识活动之前已经在从事认识活动，或者说在还没有学会游泳之前禁止下水。 诚然，我们不应当在没有考察思维形式的情况下就使用它们，但这种考察本身已经是一种认识活动。 因此，思维形式的活动必须和对于认识活动的批判合而为一。 思维形式必须自在且自为地得到考察； 它们既是对象，也是对象本身的活动； 它们自己考察自己，必须自己规定自己的界限，并揭示出自己的缺陷。 思维的这个活动后来将作为辩证法而得到专门的考察，而这里暂时只需指出，辩证法不是从外面套用到思维规定身上，而是原本就寓居在思维规定自身之内。

换言之，康德哲学的关键在于指出思维本身应当得到考察，以确定它的认识能力的限度。今天的人们已经从康德哲学那里走出来，每一个人都希望走得更远。但“更远”有两层含义：可能是前进，也可能是后退。细看之下，当代的许多哲学努力无非是旧的形而上学的那一套，亦即按照各人的天赋条件不加批判地闷头思考。

(2) Kant’s examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect of viewing them,
not absolutely and for their own sake,
but in order to see whether they are subjective or objective.
In the language of common life we mean by objective what exists outside of us and reaches us from without by means of sensation.
What Kant did was to deny that the categories, such as cause and effect, were, in this sense of the word, objective, or given in sensation, and to maintain on the contrary that they belonged to our own thought itself, to the spontaneity of thought. To that extent therefore they were subjective. And yet in spite of this, Kant gives the name objective to what is thought, to the universal and necessary, while he describes as subjective whatever is merely felt. This arrangement apparently reverses the first-mentioned use of the word, and has caused Kant to be charged with confusing language. But the charge is unfair if we more narrowly consider the facts of the case. The vulgar believe that the objects of perception which confront them, such as an individual animal, or a single star, are independent and permanent existences, compared with which thoughts are unsubstantial and dependent on something else. In fact however the perceptions of sense are the properly dependent and secondary feature, while the thoughts are really independent and primary. This being so, Kant gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to the universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in so doing. Our sensations on the other hand are subjective; for sensations lack stability in their own nature, and are no less fleeting and evanescent than thought is permanent and self-subsisting. At the present day, the special line of distinction established by Kant between the subjective and objective is adopted by the phraseology of the educated world. Thus the criticism of a work of art ought, it is said, to be not subjective, but objective — in other words, instead of springing from the particular and accidental feeling or temper of the moment, it should keep its eye on those general points of view which the laws of art establish. In the same acceptation we can distinguish in any scientific pursuit the objective and the subjective interest of the investigation.

[附释2]康德对于思维规定的考察有一个根本缺陷， 即他不是考察思维规定自在且自为的样子， 而是从它们是主观的抑或客观的这一角度出发去考察它们。 在日常用语里，人们所理解的“客观”是指一种存在于我们之外，并且通过知觉而从外面达到我们的东西。 康德否认思维规定(比如原因和作用)具有刚才所说的那种意义上的客观性，亦即否认它们是在知觉中被给予的， 而是认为它们（思维规定）属于我们的思维本身，或者说属于思维的自发性， 并在这个意义上是主观的。 但康德同样又把经过思考的东西(确切地说普遍的和必然的东西)称作客观的， 把单纯感受到的东西称作主观的。 这样一来，刚才所说的那种日常用语看起来就是头足倒置了，因此人们指责康德造成了语言的紊乱；但这个指责是很不公正的。 具体情况如下。对普通意识而言，那与它对立，可以用感官知觉到的东西(比如这只动物，这颗星星等等)是独自持存的、独立的，反之思想不是独立的，而是依赖于他者。 但实际上，可以用感官知觉到的东西才是非独立的、次要的，反之思想才是真正独立的、首要的。 在这个意义上，康德把那些符合思想的东西(普遍的和必然的东西)称作客观的，这个做法完全正确。 另一方面，可以用感官知觉到的东西无疑是主观的，因为它们不具有内在的支撑点，仅仅是短暂的和转瞬即逝的，反之思想却具有绵延性和内在持存的特征。 时至今日，正如我们看到的，康德对于客观和主观的这个区分已经成为高雅人士的日常用语；比如在评价一件艺术作品时，我们要求这个评价应当是客观的而非主观的，而这意思是说，这个评价不应当从一时偶然的、片面的感受和心情出发，而是应当注意那些普遍的、基于艺术的本质的视角。在同样的意义上，我们在科学研究中也可以区分客观的兴趣和主观的兴趣。

But after all, objectivity of thought, in Kant’s sense, is again to a certain extent subjective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary categories, are only our thoughts — separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, and of whatever is an object to us.

Objective and subjective are convenient expressions in current use, the employment of which may easily lead to confusion. Up to this point, the discussion has shown three meanings of objectivity. First, it means what has external existence, in distinction from which the subjective is what is only supposed, dreamed, &c. Secondly, it has the meaning, attached to it by Kant, of the universal and necessary, as distinguished from the particular, subjective, and occasional element which belongs to our sensations. Thirdly, as has been just explained, it means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely our thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent essence.

进而言之，康德所说的思维的客观性本身又成为主观的，因为在康德看来，思想虽然是普遍的和必然的规定，但毕竟只是我们的思想，并且与那个叫作自在之物的东西之间有一条无法逾越的鸿沟。与此相反，思维的真正的客观性意味着思想不只是我们的思想，毋宁同时是事物和全部对象的自在体(Ansich)。——"客观"和"主观"是人们可以信手拈来加以使用的术语，但伴随着这些用法也很容易产生出紊乱。按照迄今所述，客观性具有三重含义。 第一，它所指的是外在事物，有别于单纯主观的、意谓中的、臆想的东西等等； 第二，按照康德所确定的意义，它所指的是普遍的和必然的东西，有别于那些依赖于我们的感受的偶然的、片面的和主观的东西； 第三，按照我们刚才指出的那种意义，它所指的是思维的自在体，这个自在体作为一个定在者(was da ist),有别于那种仅仅被我们思考、从而与事情本身或自在的事情区分开的东西。

§ 42

(a) The Theoretical Faculty. Cognition qua cognition.
理论能力，或严格意义上的知识。

The specific ground of the categories is declared by the Critical system to lie in the primary identity of the ‘I’ in thought what Kant calls the ‘transcendental unity of self-consciousness’. The impressions from feeling and perception are, if we look to their contents, a multiplicity or miscellany of elements: and the multiplicity is equally conspicuous in their form. For sense is marked by a mutual exclusion of members; and that under two aspects, namely space and time, which, being the forms, that is to say, the universal type of perception, are themselves a priori. This congeries, afforded by sensation and perception, must however be reduced to an identity or primary synthesis. To accomplish this the ‘I’ brings it in relation to itself and unites it there in one consciousness which Kant calls ‘pure apperception’. The specific modes in which the Ego refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the understanding, the Categories.

康德哲学宣称知性概念的特定根据是思维中的自我的原初同一性(自我意识的先验统一体)。那些通过感觉和直观而被给予的表象就其内容而言是一种杂多东西；就其形式而言，就其在感性中的彼此外在而言，那些表象在它们的两个形式亦即空间和时间——二者作为直观活动的形式或普遍者本身是先天的——里面同样是杂多东西。当自我与这些感觉到和直观到的杂多东西相关联，并且作为同一个意识(纯粹统觉)在自身之内把它们联合起来，就让它们达到同一性或一种原初的综合。这些特定的关联方式就是纯粹知性概念，亦即范畴。

先验自我意识的统一性：康德认为，“我”或自我在统一经验中具有根本作用。这个“我”不是经验中的自我（即我们在经验中显现的自我），而是先验的自我，它是经验可能性的条件。这种先验自我意识的统一性使我们能够拥有对世界的一致经验。没有这种统一性，我们的经验将是一堆杂乱无章的感觉。 感觉与知觉的多样性：我们的感官经验或“印象”最初是一系列混乱且多样的元素。这些感觉通过直观形式（康德认为是空间和时间）被给予我们。空间和时间不是从经验中得出的，而是先验的形式，它们构建了我们所有的感知。它们是我们在感知任何事物时所依赖的普遍条件。 还原为同一性或初级综合：感觉和知觉的原始数据必须被综合成一个连贯的经验。这种综合不是被动发生的，而是由心灵主动完成的过程。“我”或先验自我在这一过程中起着关键作用，它将感觉的多样性与自身联系起来，从而将它们统一到一个单一的意识中。这种统一的意识就是康德所说的“纯粹统觉”。 知性的范畴：“我”综合感觉多样性的具体方式是通过范畴。范畴是知性的纯粹概念，它们先验地适用于所有经验对象。它们是我们思考和理解世界的基本结构。范畴的例子包括因果性、实体和量。这些范畴不是从经验中得出的，而是使经验成为可能的条件。

Kant, it is well known, did not put himself to much trouble in discovering the categories. ‘I’, the unity of selfconsciousness, being quite abstract and completely indeterminate, the question arises, how are we to get at the specialised forms of the ‘I’, the categories? Fortunately, the common logic offers to our hand an empirical classification of the kinds of judgment. Now, to judge is the same as to think of a determinate object. Hence the various modes of judgment, as enumerated to our hand, provide us with the several categories of thought. To the philosophy of Fichte belongs the great merit of having called attention to the need of exhibiting the necessity of these categories and giving a genuine deduction of them. Fichte ought to have produced at least one effect on the method of logic. One might have expected that the general laws of thought, the usual stock-in-trade of logicians, or the classification of notions, judgments, and syllogisms, would be no longer taken merely from observation and so only empirically treated, but be deduced from thought itself. If thought is to be capable of proving anything at all, if logic must insist upon the necessity of proofs, and if it proposes to teach the theory of demonstration, its first care should be to give a reason for its own subject.

[说明]众所周知，康德哲学不费吹灰之力就发现了那些范畴。自[117]我，自我意识的统一体，是完全抽象和全然无规定的；既然如此，康德如何得到自我的那些规定亦即范畴呢?幸运的是，普通逻辑已经以经验的方式罗列了判断的各个类型。判断活动是对于一个已规定的对象的思维。也就是说，各种现成地罗列出来的判断方式已经提供了各种思维规定。——费希特哲学有一个重大的贡献，即提醒我们必须按照思维规定的必然性去揭示它们，因此它们在本质上必须是推导出来的。——费希特哲学至少在这一点上影响了逻辑学的方法，即全部思维规定，或者说通常的逻辑素材(即不同类型的概念、判断和推论),不应当仅仅取材于观察，从而只是通过经验而被把握，而是应当从思维自身那里推导出来。如果思维能够证明某些东西，如果逻辑学要求给出证明，进而言之，如果逻辑学希望教人如何证明，那么它必须能够从一开始就证明自己的独特内容，并且指出其必然性。

这段文字批评了康德在发现范畴时过于依赖传统逻辑的经验分类，而费希特则强调范畴应当从思维的内在必然性中推导出来。费希特的这一观点推动了逻辑学方法的变革，使其从经验归纳转向内在推导，从而为逻辑学奠定了更为坚实的基础。

(1) Kant therefore holds that the categories have their source in the ‘Ego’ and that the ‘Ego’ consequently supplies the characteristics of universality and necessity. If we observe what we have before us primarily, we may describe it as a congeries or diversity: and in the categories we find the simple points or units, to which this congeries is made to converge. The world of sense is a scene of mutual exclusion: its being is outside itself. That is the fundamental feature of the sensible. ‘Now’ has no meaning except in reference to a before and a hereafter. Red, in the same way, only subsists by being opposed to yellow and blue. Now this other thing is outside the sensible; which latter is, only in so far as it is not the other, and only in so far as that other is. But thought, or the ‘Ego’, occupies a position the very reverse of the sensible, with its mutual exclusions, and its being outside itself. The ‘I’ is the primary identity — at one with itself and all at home in itself. The word ‘I’ expresses the mere act of bringing-to-bear-upon-self: and whatever is placed in this unit or focus is affected by it and transformed into it. The ‘I’ is as it were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of sense and reduces it to unity. This is the process which Kant calls pure apperception in distinction from the common apperception, to which the plurality it receives is a plurality still; whereas pure apperception is rather an act by which the ‘I’ makes the materials ‘mine’.

This view has at least the merit of giving a correct expression to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man’s endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and subdue it to himself: and to this end the positive reality of the world must be as it were crushed and pounded, in other words, idealised. At the same time we must note that it is not the mere act of our personal self-consciousness which introduces an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this identity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so kind as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, and it again drives them back to the absolute unity.

[附释1]康德的观点是，思维规定来源于自我，因此是自我提供了普遍性和必然性等规定。——如果我们观察首先呈现在眼前的事物，就会发现它们全都是一种杂多东西，而范畴则是作为一种单纯性而与这种杂多东西相关联。反之感性的东西是彼此外在的，并且存在于自身之外；这是它们所特有的基本规定。比如"现在"仅仅存在于与“过去”和“未来”的关联中。同理，“红"只有在与“黄”和“蓝”相对立的时候才存在着。但这个他者位于感性东西之外，因此感性东西之所以存在，仅仅因为它不是他者，并且存在着一个他者。——但思维或自我的情形恰恰与那些彼此外在的、并且存在于自身之外的感性东西相反。自我是原初同一的、自身合一的、绝对地安然于自身的存在者。当我说“我”的时候，这是一个抽象的自身关联，凡是被设定在这个统一体之内的东西，都受到其感染，并且转化为统一体。因此自我仿佛是一个熔炉和烈焰，吞噬了漠不相关的杂多性，将其还原到统一体。

还原的时候有各种问题呢，不禁让人想起知觉现象学。 问题所有问题都被还原成傻逼了。 这就是康德所说的纯粹统觉，它和日常统觉的区别在于，后者把杂多东西原封不动地接纳下来，反之纯粹统觉却必须被看作一种 属我化(Vermeinigen)的活动。 ——这个观点无疑正确地说出了全部意识的本性。 总的说来，人类的努力在于认识世界、占有世界和统治世界，最终仿佛必须把世界的实在性碾为粉碎，亦即将其理念化。 但同时必须指出的是，并非自我意识的主观活动把绝对统一体输入到杂多性里面。毋宁说，这个同一性是绝对者，亦即真相本身。换言之，绝对者仿佛是出于善意而放任个别东西去自得其乐，然后又亲自驱使它们返回到绝对的统一体。

(2) Expressions like ‘transcendental unity of self-consciousness’ have an ugly look about them, and suggest a monster in the background: but their meaning is not so abstruse as it looks. Kant’s meaning of transcendental may be gathered by the way he distinguishes it from transcendent. The transcendent may be said to be what steps out beyond the categories of the understanding:
a sense in which the term is first employed in mathematics.
Thus in geometry you are told to conceive the circumference of a circle as formed of an infinite number of infinitely small straight lines. In other words, characteristics which the understanding holds to be totally different, the straight line and the curve, are expressly invested with identity. Another transcendent of the same kind is the self-consciousness which is identical with itself and infinite in itself, as distinguished from the ordinary consciousness which derives its form and tone from finite materials. That unity of self-consciousness, however, Kant called transcendental only; and he meant thereby that the unity was only in our minds and did not attach to the objects apart from our knowledge of them.

[附释2]乍看起来，诸如“自我意识的先验统一体”之类说法是很唬人的，仿佛其后面隐藏着什么庞然大物似的。实则事情非常简 单。关于康德所理解的“先验”(transzendental)究竟是什么意思，可以通过它和“超验”(transzendent)的区别体现出来。 简言之，凡是超越了知性规定性的东西都是超验的， 而在这个意义上，超验的东西首先出现在数学里面。 比如按照几何学的规定，我们必须把圆周想象为一个由无穷多和无穷小的直线组成的东西。在这里，那些在知性看来绝对不同的规定("直”和“曲")被明确地设定为同一的。 同理，自身同一的、内在无限的自我意识(有别于那种受有限材料规定的普通意识)也是这样的超验的东西。 然而康德宣称自我意识的那个统一体仅仅是先验的，而他的意思是说，那个统一体仅仅是主观的，并不归属于自在存在着的对象本身。

(3) To regard the categories as subjective only, i.e. as a part of ourselves, must seem very odd to the natural mind; and no doubt there is something queer about it. It is quite true however that the categories are not contained in the sensation as it is given us. When, for instance, we look at a piece of sugar, we find it is hard, white, sweet, etc. All these properties we say are united in one object. Now it is this unity that is not found in the sensation. The same thing happens if we conceive two events to stand in the relation of cause and effect. The senses only inform us of the two several occurrences which follow each other in time. But that the one is cause, the other effect — in other words, the causal nexus between the two — is not perceived by sense; it is only evident to thought. Still, though the categories, such as unity, or cause and effect, are strictly the property of thought, it by no means follows that they must be ours merely and not also characteristics of the objects. Kant however confines them to the subject-mind, and his philosophy may be styled subjective idealism: for he holds that both the form and the matter of knowledge are supplied by the Ego — or knowing subject — the form by our intellectual, the matter by our sentient ego.

So far as regards the content of this subjective idealism, not a word need be wasted. It might perhaps at first sight be imagined, that objects would lose their reality when their unity was transferred to the subject. But neither we nor the objects would have anything to gain by the mere fact that they possessed being.

The main point is not, that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their content is true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have being. What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it. It might also be alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote self-conceit. But surely if a man’s world be the sum of his sensible perceptions, he has no reason to be vain of such a world. Laying aside therefore as unimportant this distinction between subjective and objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: i.e. its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective. If mere existence be enough to make objectivity, even a crime is objective: but it is an existence which is nullity at the core, as is definitely made apparent when the day of punishment comes.

[附释3]认为范畴仅仅属于我们(仅仅是主观的),这个观点在自然意识看来必定是很奇怪的，更何况它确实包含着某些偏颇之处。[119]当然，认为范畴没有包含在直接的感觉里面，这一点至少是正确的。 比如我们观察一块方糖；它是硬的、白的、甜的，如此等等。 于是我们说，所有这些特性都统一在同一个对象里，而这个统一体是感觉不到的。 当我们认为两个事件之间有因果关系，也是同样的道理。我们在这里知觉到的是两个在时间中前后相继的个别事件。 但我们不是通过知觉，而是通过我们的思维本身才断定前一个事件是原因，后一个事件是后果(断定二者之间的因果关系)。 虽然范畴(比如“统一体"、"原因和后果"等等)归属于思维本身，但我们绝不能由此推断它们仅仅是主观的东西，而非同时是对象本身的规定。 但康德恰恰是这么认为的，而他的哲学也成了主观唯心主义，因为在他看来，自我(认识着的主体)既提供了认识活动的形式，也提供了认识活动的材料——既有思维的材料，也有感觉的材料。——实际上，这种主观唯心主义的内容根本不值一提。乍看之下，如果把对象的统一体放置到主体里面，就会剥夺对象的实在性。 但如果对象仅仅存在着，那么无论是对象还是我们都是索然无味的。 关键在于内容，以及这个内容是不是真实的。如果事物仅仅存在着，那么这对它们自己而言也毫无助益。时间降临到存在者身上，于是存在者也将不存在。——此外也可以说，主观唯心主义会让人变得太过于自以为是。但如果他的世界只是一堆感性直观，那么他有什么理由为这样一个世界感到自豪呢? 简言之，关键根本不是在于主观性和客观性的区别，而是在于内容，而内容既是主观的，也是客观的。 如果"客观"所指的是单纯的实存，那么一个罪行也是客观的，但这是一个内在虚无的实存，因为它作为罪行而言只有通过刑罚才获得定在。

§ 43

The Categories may be viewed in two aspects. On the one hand it is by their instrumentality that the mere perception of sense rises to objectivity and experience. On the other hand these notions are unities in our consciousness merely: they are consequently conditioned by the material given to them, and having nothing of their own they can be applied to use only within the range of experience. But the other constituent of experience, the impressions of feeling and perception, is not one whit less subjective than the categories.

一方面，范畴把单纯的知觉提升为客观性，提升为经验，但另一方面，[120]这些概念作为单纯主观意识的统一体，以给定的材料为条件，本身是空洞的，只能在经验中得到应用和使用，而经验的另一个组成部分，感觉规定和直观规定，同样只是一种主观的东西。

To assert that the categories taken by themselves are empty can scarcely be right, seeing that they have a content, at all events, in the special stamp and significance which they possess. Of course the content of the categories is not perceptible to the senses, nor is it in time and space: but that is rather a merit than a defect. A glimpse of this meaning of content may be observed to affect our ordinary thinking. A book or a speech for example is said to have a great deal in it, to be full of content in proportion to the greater number of thoughts and general results to be found in it: while, on the contrary, we should never say that any book, e.g. a novel, had much in it, because it included a great number of single incidents, situations, and the like. Even the popular voice thus recognises that something more than the facts of sense is needed to make a work pregnant with matter. And what is this additional desideratum but thoughts, or in the first instance the categories? And yet it is not altogether wrong, it should be added, to call the categories of themselves empty, if it be meant that they and the logical Idea, of which they are the members, do not constitute the whole of philosophy, but necessarily lead onwards in due progress to the real departments of Nature and Mind. Only let the progress not be misunderstood. The logical Idea does not thereby come into possession of a content originally foreign to it: but by its own native action is specialised and developed to Nature and Mind.

[附释]"范畴本身是空洞的"这一观点是缺乏根据的，因为范畴作为已规定的东西，任何时候都具有内容。诚然，范畴的内容不是可以用感官知觉到的，不是位于空间和时间之中，但这不应当被看作一个缺陷，毋宁应当被看作范畴的一个优点。就连日常意识也承认这一点，比如当人们说一本书或一番话很有分量时，就是指它们具有丰富的内容，包含着很多思想或普遍的结论，如此等等，——反之，哪怕一本书尤其是一部长篇小说把大量个别事件和个别情景堆砌在一起，人们也不会因此说它具有丰富的内容。就此而言，日常意识公开承认，内容包含着的东西比感性材料更多：这个“更多”就是指思想，在这里首先指范畴。——此外还需要指出，"范畴本身是空洞的"这一观点在某种意义上也是正确的，因为我们不应当止步于范畴及其总体性(逻辑理念),而是应当推进到自然界和精神的实在领域。至于这个推进，我们切不可这样理解，仿佛有一个陌生的内容通过这个方式从外面来到逻辑理念，毋宁说，逻辑理念自己的活动就在于把自己继续规定和扩展为自然界和精神。

§ 44

It follows that the categories are no fit terms to express the Absolute – the Absolute not being given in perception – and Understanding, or knowledge by means of the categories, is consequently incapable of knowing the Things-in-themselves.

范畴不可能是绝对者的规定，因为绝对者并没有在一个知觉中被给予。正因如此，依靠范畴的知性或认识不可能认识到自在之物。

The Thing-in-itself (and under ‘thing’ is embraced even Mind and God) expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it. It is easy to see what is left utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an ‘other-world’ the negative of every image, feeling, and definite thought. Nor does it require much penetration to see that this caput mortuum is still only a product of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to abstraction unalloyed: that it is the work of the empty ‘Ego’, which makes an object out of this empty self-identity of its own. The negative characteristic which this abstract identity receives as an object is also enumerated among the categories of Kant, and is no less familiar than the empty identity aforesaid. Hence one can only read with surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. On the contrary there is nothing we can know so easily.

[说明]自在之物(这里所说的“物”也包括精神、上帝)指的是这样一个对象，它那里抽离了全部与意识的联系，抽离了全部与对象有关的感[121]觉规定和特定思想。不难看出，这样就只剩下一个完全抽象和全然空洞的东西，确切地说，一个彼岸；这是对于各种表象、感觉、特定思想等等的否定。但我们同样可以轻松地发现，这具caput mortuum[枯骨]本身只是思维的产物，这个思维已经推进到纯粹的抽象，成为空洞的自我，并且把它的这种空洞的自身同一性当作自己的对象。这个抽象的同一性作为对象而获得的否定的规定，也被康德列入他的范畴表，并且和那个空洞的同一性一样都是人们非常熟悉的东西。——既然如此，当看到康德絮絮叨叨地说什么自在之物是不可知的，我们只能感到无比惊讶；因为没有什么东西是比自在之物更容易知道的。

§ 45

It is Reason, the faculty of the Unconditioned（Unconditioned"译为"无条件者"，突出其作为哲学本体的超越性。）, which discovers the conditioned nature of the knowledge comprised in experience. What is thus called the object of Reason, the Infinite or Unconditioned, is nothing but self-sameness, or the primary identity of the ‘Ego’ in thought (mentioned in § 42). Reason itself is the name given to the abstract ‘Ego’ or thought, which makes this pure identity its aim or object (cf. note to the preceding §). Now this identity, having no definite attribute at all, can receive no illumination from the truths of experience, for the reason that these refer always to definite facts. Such is the sort of Unconditioned that is supposed to be the absolute truth of Reason what is termed the Idea; while the cognitions of experience are reduced to the level of untruth and declared to be appearances.

理性，作为认识无条件者的能力，洞察到这些经验知识是有条件的。康德所说的理性对象，无条件者或无限者，无非是一种自身等同的东西，亦即前面(§42)提到的思维里的自我的原初同一性。 当这种抽象自我或思维把这个纯粹的同一性当作自己的对象，就叫作理性。 (参阅上节之"说明"。)经验知识不符合这个完全无规定的同一性，因为它们始终具有已规定的内容。当这样的无条件者被看作理性的绝对者和真相(被看作理念),经验知识就被看作非真实的东西，亦即现象。

"Unconditioned"译为"无条件者"，突出其作为哲学本体的超越性。"Ego"在费希特语境中译为"自我"，黑格尔的"Idea"保留为"理念"。"telos"（希腊语目的因）译为"终极目的"，强调理念的完成性。

Kant was the first definitely to signalise the distinction between Reason and Understanding. The object of the former, as he applied the term, was the infinite and unconditioned, of the latter the finite and conditioned. Kant did valuable service when he enforced the finite character of the cognitions of the understanding founded merely upon experience, and stamped their contents with the name of appearance.
But his mistake was to stop at the purely negative point of view, and to limit the unconditionality of Reason to an abstract self-sameness without any shade of distinction.
It degrades Reason to a finite and conditioned thing, to identify it with a mere stepping beyond the finite and conditioned range of understanding. The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature. In the same way Kant restored the Idea to its proper dignity: vindicating it for Reason, as a thing distinct from abstract analytic determinations or from the merely sensible conceptions which usually appropriate to themselves the name of ideas. But as respects the Idea also, he never got beyond its negative aspect, as what ought to be but is not.

[附释]康德第一个明确提出并强调知性和理性之间的区别，也就是说，知性是以有限者和有条件者为对象，反之理性却是以无限者和无条件者为对象。诚然，康德指出了那些仅仅依靠经验的知性知识的有限性，并称其内容为现象，这是一个不容否认的重大成果。但我们毕竟不能止步于这个否定意义上的成果，把无条件的理性仅仅归结为一种抽象的、排除了区别的自身同一性。当康德通过这个方式认为理性仅仅是对于知性的有限者和有条件者的超越，理性本身实际上就相应地降格为一个有限者和有条件者，因为真实的无限者并不是有限者的单纯彼岸，而是把有限者当作已扬弃的东西而包含在自身之内。同样的情况也发生在理念身上。虽然康德将理念判决给理性，把理念和抽象的知性规定或单纯感性的表象(这类表象在日常生活里经常也被称作"理念")区分开，并在这个意义上恢复了理念的荣誉，但就理念本身而言，康德同样止步于否定的东西和单纯的应当。

"real infinite"译为"真正的无限性"，呼应黑格尔对"坏无限/真无限"（schlechte Unendlichkeit/wahre Unendlichkeit）的著名区分。

The view that the objects of immediate consciousness, which constitute the body of experience, are mere appearances (phenomena) was another important result of the Kantian philosophy. Common Sense, that mixture of sense and understanding, believes the objects of which it has knowledge to be severally independent and self-supporting; and when it becomes evident that they tend towards and limit one another, the interdependence of one upon another is reckoned something foreign to them and to their true nature.
The very opposite is the truth. The things immediately known are mere appearances — in other words, the ground of their being is not in themselves but in something else. But then comes the important step of defining what this something else is. According to Kant, the things that we know about are to us appearances only, and we can never know their essential nature, which belongs to another world we cannot approach.

再者，把直接意识的对象——这些对象构成了经验知识的内容——看作单纯的现象，这同样是康德哲学的一个重大成果。 普通意识(亦即感性的—知性式的意识)以为它所知道的个别对象是独立自持的， 而当它发现这些对象是相互关联的和互为条件的，就认为它们相互之间的这种依赖性是某种外在于对象的东西，不属于对象的本质。 针对这一点，康德指出，我们直接知道的那些对象是单纯的现象， 也就是说， 它们之所以存在的根据不是位于它们自身之内，而是位于一个他者那里。 接下来的关键就是如何规定这个他者。在康德哲学看来，我们所知道的那些事物仅仅是对我们而言的现象，而它们的自在体始终是我们不能触及的一个彼岸。这种主观唯心主义既然认为意识内容的基础是一种仅仅属于我们、仅仅由我们所设定的东西，当然会遭到朴素意识的正当的抵触。 实际上，真实的情形是这样的，即我们所直接知道的那些事物不仅对我们而言，而且自在地就[123]是单纯的现象，正因如此，有限事物的宿命就在于，不是在自身之内，而是在普遍的、神性的理念里具有其存在的根据。这种对于事物的看法同样必须被称作唯心主义，而且是在区别于康德哲学的那种主观唯心主义的情况下被称作绝对唯心主义。就事情本身而言，这种绝对唯心主义虽然超越了普通的实在论意识，但不能仅仅被看作哲学的私有财产。毋宁说，它也构成了全部宗教意识的基础，因为宗教意识同样认为，全部存在者的总括亦即这个眼前的世界是由上帝创造和统治着的。

自然意识的错觉 独断实在论倾向 自然意识（感性直观与知性的混合体）默认其认知对象具有独立自存性——每个事物都被视为自我支撑的实体，其存在无需外求。

关系性的误置 当对象间的相互关联性与制约性显现时（如因果链条），自然意识将这种相互依存性视为外在于事物本质的偶然属性，而非其内在规定。

康德的现象学翻转 现象的本质他律性 真相恰恰相反：直接认知的事物仅是现象，其存在根据不在自身，而在于他者（即物自体，Ding an sich）。现象的本质是关系性存在，其可能性条件超越现象界。

认识界限的划定 康德断言：人类理性只能认识现象，永远无法穿透现象抵达物自体的本质。这个"他者世界"成为不可通达的领域，理性在此遭遇不可逾越的界限。

Plain minds have not unreasonably taken exception to this subjective idealism, with its reduction of the facts of consciousness to a purely personal world, created by ourselves alone. For the true statement of the case is rather as follows. The things of which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant’s; but in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical philosophy should be termed absolute idealism. Absolute idealism, however, though it is far in advance of vulgar realism, is by no means merely restricted to philosophy. It lies at the root of all religion; for religion too believes the actual world we see, the sum total of existence, to be created and governed by God.

§ 46

But it is not enough simply to indicate the existence of the object of Reason.
Curiosity impels us to seek for knowledge of this identity, this empty thing-in-itself.
Now knowledge means such an acquaintance with the object as apprehends its distinct and special subject-matter.
But such subject-matter involves a complex interconnection in the object itself, and supplies a ground of connection with many other objects. In the present case, to express the nature of the features of the Infinite or Thing-in-itself, Reason would have nothing except the categories: and in any endeavour so to employ them Reason becomes over-soaring or ‘transcendent’.

但我们终归需要去认识这个同一性或空洞的自在之物。所谓认识活动，无非是指知道一个对象的已规定的内容。但已规定的内容在其自身之内包含着杂多的联系，并且奠定了与其他许多对象的联系。在康德看来，理性只能用范畴去规定那个无限者或自在之物，此外别无他法；当理性将范畴用于这个目的，就成为飞跃的(超验的)。

Here begins the second stage of the Criticism of Reason – which, as an independent piece of work, is more valuable than the first.
The first part, as has been explained above, teaches that the categories originate in the unity of self-consciousness; that any knowledge which is gained by their means has nothing objective in it, and that the very objectivity claimed for them is only subjective. So far as this goes, the Kantian Criticism presents that ‘common’ type of idealism known as Subjective Idealism. It asks no questions about the meaning or scope of the categories, but simply considers the abstract form of subjectivity and objectivity, and that even in such a partial way that the former aspect, that of subjectivity, is retained as a final and purely affirmative term of thought. In the second part, however, when Kant examines the application, as it is called, which Reason makes of the categories in order to know its objects, the content of the categories, at least in some points of view, comes in for discussion: or, at any rate, an opportunity presented itself for a discussion of the question. It is worth while to see what decision Kant arrives at on the subject of metaphysic, as this application of the categories to the unconditioned is called. His method of procedure we shall here briefly state and criticise.

[说明]这里进入理性批判的第二个方面，而这个方面本身比第一个方面更重要。简言之，第一个方面就是此前出现的那个观点，即范畴来源于自我意识的统一体；这样一来，那些依赖于范畴的知识实际上没有包含着任何客观的东西，而康德指派给它们的那种客观性(§40和§41)本身仅仅是某种主观的东西。 就此而言，康德的批判完全是一种主观的(肤浅的)唯心主义，它不是深入内容，而是仅仅关注主观性的各种抽象形式，甚至以片面的方式止步于主观性，认为它是一个终极的、完全肯定的规定。但康德在考察理性如何应用范畴去认识自己的对象时，至少在某[124]些方面谈到了范畴的内容，或者说至少有机会去谈论这个问题。至于康德如何评价这种将范畴应用于无条件者的做法，亦即如何评价形而上学，这件事情值得特殊的关注；因此这里不妨简略地叙述并批判他的方案。

§ 47

[a] The first of the unconditioned entities which Kant examines is the Soul (see above, § 34). ‘In my consciousness’, he says, ‘I always find that I
(1) am the determining subject;
(2) am singular or abstractly simple;
(3) am identical, or one and the same, in all the variety of what I am conscious of;
(4) distinguish myself as thinking from all the things outside me.’

1.第一个得到考察的无条件者是灵魂(参阅§34)。——在我的意识里，我总是发现：α)我是一个进行规定的主体；β)我是一个单一的东西，或者说是一个抽象的一单纯的东西；y)我在我所意识到的全部杂多东西里是同一个东西，亦即同一的东西；8)我把我自己作为思维者与所有外在于我的物区分开。

Now the method of the old metaphysic, as Kant correctly states it, consisted in substituting for these statements of experience the corresponding categories or metaphysical terms. Thus arise these four new propositions: (a) the Soul is a substance; (b) it is a simple substance; (c) it is numerically identical at the various periods of existence; (d) it stands in relation to space.

规定性主体（das bestimmende Subjekt） → "我"是统觉（Apperzeption）的主动综合者，而非被规定的客体。 单一性与抽象单纯性（singulär oder abstrakt einfach） → "我"不可分解为部分，其同一性不依赖任何复合结构。 同一性基底（identisch, in allem Bewussten dasselbe） → 在一切意识内容的杂多性中，"我"保持自我同一的基底地位。 思维与广延的二元区分（als denkend von allen äußeren Dingen unterschieden） → "我"作为思维主体，与外部空间性事物（res extensa）根本异质。

康德正确地指出，旧的形而上学的方案在于用思维规定或相应的范畴取代了这些经验的规定，由此得出如下四个命题：α)灵魂是实体；β)灵魂是单纯的实体；γ)灵魂在其存在的不同时间里，在数目上是同一的；8)灵魂与空间里的事物有关系。

Kant discusses this translation, and draws attention to the Paralogism or mistake of confounding one kind of truth with another. He points out that empirical attributes have here been replaced by categories; and shows that we are not entitled to argue from the former to the latter, or to put the latter in place of the former.

康德指出，这个过渡的缺陷在于混淆了两种不同类型的规定亦即经验规定和范畴，从而导致谬误推论。因此，从经验规定推及范畴，或简言之用范畴取代经验规定，这是不合法的。

康德批判传统形而上学将上述分析性命题偷换为综合判断，从而非法推导出灵魂作为实体（Substanz）、单纯物（einfaches Wesen）、人格同一体（persönliche Identität）及与物质世界交互（Kommerzium）的结论。这种推理的谬误在于： 范畴的误植：将仅适用于现象界的范畴（如实体、因果）应用于超验的"我思"（Ich denke）。 先验幻相（transzendentaler Schein）：理性将主观思维的必然形式误认为客观存在的属性。

This criticism obviously but repeats the observation of Hume (§ 39) that the categories as a whole – ideas of universality and necessity – are entirely absent from sensation; and that the empirical fact both in form and contents differs from its intellectual formulation.

很显然，这个批判所表达的无非是此前(§39)所述的休谟的观点，即所有思维规定——普遍性和必然性——都不会出现在知觉里，以及经验中的东西无论是在内容上还是在形式上都不同于思想规定。

If the purely empirical fact were held to constitute the credentials of the thought, then no doubt it would be indispensable to be able precisely to identify the ‘idea’ in the ‘impression’.

假若经验中的东西能够为思想提供担保，那么我们当然有必要在知觉中精确地查证思想的来源。

And in order to make out, in his criticism of the metaphysical psychology, that the soul cannot be described as substantial, simple, self-same, and as maintaining its independence in intercourse with the material world, Kant argues from the single ground that the several attributes of the soul, which consciousness lets us feel in experience, are not exactly the same attributes as result from the action of thought thereon. But we have seen above that according to Kant all knowledge, even experience, consists in thinking our impressions – in other words, in transforming into intellectual categories the attributes primarily belonging to sensation.

Unquestionably one good result of the Kantian criticism was that it emancipated mental philosophy from the ‘soul-thing’, from the categories, and, consequently, from questions about the simplicity, complexity, materiality, etc., of the soul. But even for the common sense of ordinary men, the true point of view, from which the inadmissibility of these forms best appears, will be not that they are thoughts, but that thoughts of such a stamp neither can nor do retain truth.

If thought and phenomenon do not perfectly correspond to one another, we are free at least to choose which of the two shall be held the defaulter. The Kantian idealism, where it touches on the world of Reason, throws the blame on the thoughts; saying that the thoughts are defective, as not being exactly fitted to the sensations and to a mode of mind wholly restricted within the range of sensation, in which as such there are no traces of the presence of these thoughts. But as to the actual content of the thought, no question is raised.

为了表明灵魂不可能具有实体性、单纯性、自身同一性以及在与物质世界结合时保持着的独立性，康德在批判形而上学的心理学时，特意强调指出，意识在关于灵魂的经验中所获得的规定与思维同时生产出来的规定并不完全相同。根据此前的阐述，康德甚至认为全部认识活动乃至经验所做的事情都是去思考各种知觉，也就是说，首先把那些属于知觉的东西转化为思维规定。——康德的批判有一个很好的成果始终是值得重视的，即从此以后，关于精神的哲学思考已经摆脱了灵魂物，摆脱了范畴，随之摆脱了灵魂的单纯性、复合性、物质性等问题。——但就连普通人类知性都知道这个真实的观点，即这些形式之所以不被采纳，倒不是因为它们是思想，而是因为这样的思想本身没有包含着真理。——如果思想和现象彼此不能完全符合，那么人们首先可以选择究竟把哪一方看作有缺陷的东西。在康德的唯心主义里，只要涉及理性的对象，就把缺陷归之于思想，简言之，因为思想与知觉到的东西和一个限制在知觉范围之内的意识不相匹配，不能出现在这样一个意识里，所以思想不能触及理性的对象。至于思想的内容本身，这里根本没有谈到。

§ 47n

Paralogisms are a species of unsound syllogism, the especial vice of which consists in employing one and the same word in the two premises with a different meaning. According to Kant the method adopted by the rational psychology of the old metaphysicians, when they assumed that the qualities of the phenomenal soul, as given in experience, formed part of its own real essence, was based upon such a Paralogism. Nor can it be denied that predicates like simplicity, permanence, etc., are inapplicable to the soul. But their unfitness is not due to the ground assigned by Kant, that Reason, by applying them, would exceed its appointed bounds. The true ground is that this style of abstract terms is not good enough for the soul, which is very much more than a mere simple or unchangeable sort of thing. And thus, for example, while the soul may be admitted to be simple selfsameness, it is at the same time active and institutes distinctions in its own nature. But whatever is merely or abstractly simple is as such also a mere dead thing. By his polemic against the metaphysic of the past Kant discarded those predicates from the soul or mind. He did well; but when he came to state his reasons, his failure is apparent.

[附释]一般说来，谬误推论(Paralogismen)是一些错误的推论，确切地说，它们的错误在于将两个前提里的同一个词语在不同的意义上加以使用。在康德看来，旧的形而上学在理性心理学里采用的[126]方法就是基于这样的谬误推论，即把灵魂的单纯经验的规定看作灵魂自在且自为地具有的规定。——此外康德也正确地指出，诸如单纯性、恒常性之类谓词是不能添附在灵魂身上的，但这件事情的真正原因不是像康德所说的那样，在于理性逾越了自身的界限，而是在于这类抽象的知性规定对灵魂来说是一种过于糟糕的规定，因为灵魂绝非只是一个单纯的、恒常的东西，如此等等。举例来说，灵魂诚然是一种单纯的自身一性，但它同时是活动着的，在自身之内自己区分着自己，反之那种完全抽象的单纯东西本身是僵死的。——康德通过批驳旧的形而上学而把那些谓词从灵魂和精神那里清除出去，这必须被看作一个伟大的成果，但他为此给出的理由却是完全错误的。

§ 48

[b] The second unconditioned object is the World (§ 35). In the attempt which reason makes to comprehend the unconditioned nature of the World, it falls into what are called Antinomies. In other words it maintains two opposite propositions about the same object, and in such a way that each of them has to be maintained with equal necessity. From this it follows that the body of cosmical fact, the specific statements descriptive of which run into contradiction, cannot be a self-subsistent reality, but only an appearance. The explanation offered by Kant alleges that the contradiction does not affect the object in its own proper essence, but attaches only to the Reason which seeks to comprehend it.

2.当理性试图去认识第二个无条件的对象(§35)亦即世界，就陷入二律背反，也就是说，它对同一个对象提出两个相反的命题，而且这两个命题中的每一个都必定具有同样的必然性。由此得出，世界的内容既然陷入矛盾的规定，就不是自在的，毋宁只能是现象。至于二律背反的解决，就是指出矛盾不属于对象本身，而是仅仅属于认识着的理性。

In this way the suggestion was broached that the contradiction is occasioned by the subject-matter itself, or by the intrinsic quality of the categories. And to offer the idea that the contradiction introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of Understanding is inevitable and essential was to make one of the most important steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the issue thus raised the more trivial was the solution. Its only motive was an excess of tenderness for the things of the world. The blemish of contradiction, it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of the world; but there could be no objection to attach it to the thinking Reason, to the essence of mind. Probably nobody will feel disposed to deny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing mind; meaning by ‘phenomenal’ the world as it presents itself to the senses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison is instituted between the essence of the world and the essence of the mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the modest dogma has been advanced by one, and repeated by others, that thought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction. It is no escape to turn round and explain that Reason falls into contradiction only by applying the categories. For this application of the categories is maintained to be necessary, and Reason is not supposed to be equipped with any other forms but the categories for the purpose of cognition. But cognition is determining and determinate thinking: so that, if Reason be mere empty indeterminate thinking, it thinks nothing. And if in the end Reason be reduced to mere identity without diversity (see next §), it will in the end also win a happy release from contradiction at the slight sacrifice of all its facets and contents.

[说明]康德在这里终于明确说出，是内容本身(亦即范畴本身)引起了矛盾。这个思想——知性规定在理性的对象那里所设定的矛盾是本质上的和必然的矛盾——必须被看作近代哲学取得的最重要和最深刻的进步之一。但这个观点有多深刻，其解答就有多肤浅；这个解答只是出于对[127]世间事物的温情。据说世间存在者本身不应当受到矛盾的玷污，毋宁只有思维着的理性或精神性存在者才包含着矛盾。不可否认，是现象世界给进行观察的精神指出各种矛盾，——是现象世界给主观精神、感性和知性提供对象。但如果我们比较一下世间存在者和精神性存在者，就会惊诧地发现，人要幼稚到何等程度，才会提出并附和那个谦卑的说法，即那自相矛盾的不是世间存在者，而是思维着的存在者，亦即理性。诸如“理性仅仅通过范畴的应用而陷入矛盾"之类说辞是无济于事的。因为这等于是说，这个应用是必然的，而理性除了范畴之外没有别的规定可以用于认识活动。实际上，认识活动是一种进行规定的和被规定的思维；假若理性仅仅是一种空洞的、无规定的思维，那么它所思考的就是无。假若理性最终被归结为那种空洞的同一性(参阅下一节),那么当它最终通过毅然舍弃全部内容和内涵而摆脱矛盾，这反而是一件幸运的事情。

It may also be noted that his failure to make a more thorough study of Antinomy was one of the reasons why Kant enumerated only four Antinomies. These four attracted his notice, because, as may be seen in his discussion of the so-called Paralogisms of Reason, he assumed the list of the categories as a basis of his argument. Employing what has subsequently become a favourite fashion, he simply put the object under a rubric otherwise ready to hand, instead of deducing its characteristics from its notion. Further deficiencies in the treatment of the Antinomies I have pointed out, as occasion offered, in my Science of Logic. Here it will be sufficient to say that the Antinomies are not confined to the four special objects taken from Cosmology: they appear in all objects of every kind, in all conceptions, notions, and Ideas. To be aware of this and to know objects in this property of theirs makes a vital part in a philosophical theory. For the property thus indicated is what we shall afterwards describe as the Dialectical influence in logic.

此外可以指出，康德没有更深入地考察二律背反，因此仅仅列出四个二律背反。之所以如此，是因为他像对待所谓的谬误推论那样以范畴表为前提，并且一直使用这个备受偏爱的手法，不是从概念推导出对象的各种规定，而是仅仅让对象服从一个现成已有的表格。至于二律背反的更多缺陷，我在《逻辑学》①里已经予以揭示。——唯一需要强调的是，二律背反绝非仅仅出现在那四个取之于宇宙论的特殊对象里，而是也出现在[128]全部种类的全部对象里，出现在全部表象、概念和理念里。哲学思辨的关键就在于知道这一点并且认识到对象的这个特性。这个特性的结果随后把自己规定为逻辑性的辩证环节。

The principles of the metaphysical philosophy gave rise to the belief that, when cognition lapsed into contradictions, it was a mere accidental aberration, due to some subjective mistake in argument and inference.
According to Kant, however, thought has a natural tendency to issue in contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seeks to apprehend the infinite.
We have in the latter part of the above paragraph referred to the philosophical importance of the antinomies of reason, and shown how the recognition of their existence helped largely to get rid of the rigid dogmatism of the metaphysic of understanding, and to direct attention to the Dialectical movement of thought. But here too Kant, as we must add, never got beyond the negative result that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, and never penetrated to the discovery of what the antinomies really and positively mean. That true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual thing involves a coexistence of opposed elements. Consequently to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations. The old metaphysic, as we have already seen, when it studied the objects of which it sought a metaphysical knowledge, went to work by applying categories abstractly and to the exclusion of their opposites.

[附释]按照旧的形而上学的观点，如果认识活动陷入矛盾，那么这只是一个偶然的紊乱，是由推论和推理中的一个主观错误造成的。反之按照康德的观点，思维本身的本性就注定了，当它企图认识无条件者时，就会陷入矛盾(二律背反)。 诚然，正如上节之"说明"指出的，二律背反之揭示必须被看作哲学知识的一个极为重要的推进，因为它克服了知性形而上学的僵化的独断论，并且指明了思维的辩证运动。 但我们同时必须指出，康德在这里仍然止步于那个单纯否定意义上的成果，即事物的自在体是不可认识的，却没有认识到二律背反的真正的和肯定的意义。 简言之，二律背反的真正的和肯定的意义在于， 首先，全部现实的东西都在自身之内包含着相互对立的规定； 其次，认识一个对象，或更确切地说，对一个对象进行概念把握，无非是指意识到对象是相互对立的规定的一个具体的统一体。

Kant, on the other hand, tried to prove that the statements issuing through this method could be met by other statements of contrary import with equal warrant and equal necessity. In the enumeration of these antinomies he narrowed his ground to the cosmology of the old metaphysical system, and in his discussion made out four antinomies, a number which rests upon the list of the categories. The first antinomy is on the question: Whether we are or are not to think the world limited in space and time. In the second antinomy we have a discussion of the dilemma: Matter must be conceived either as endlessly divisible, or as consisting of atoms. The third antinomy bears upon the antithesis of freedom and necessity, to such extent as it is embraced in the question, Whether everything in the world must be supposed subject to the condition of causality, or if we can also assume free beings, in other words absolute initial points of action, in the world. Finally, the fourth antinomy is the dilemma: Either the world as a whole has a cause or it is uncaused.

此前我们曾经指出，旧的形而上学去考察对象是为了获得形而上的知识，而它为此采用的办法就是使用一些抽象的知性规定，同时排除了与之相对立的规定，反之康德试图证明，那些通过这个方式而得出的主张总是与一些内容相反的主张相对立，而且双方具有同等的合法性和同等的必然性。康德在揭示这些二律背反时，把自己限定在旧的形而上学的宇宙论上面，并且在批驳这种宇宙论时，依据范畴表而提炼出四个二律背反。第一个二律背反涉及的问题是，我们是否可以设想世界就空间和时间而言是受限制的?第二个二律背反[129] 所讨论的是这样一个两难选择，即物质究竟应当被看作无限可分的呢，抑或是由原子组成的?第三个二律背反涉及自由和必然性的对立，也就是说，康德提出这样一个问题：我们是必须把世界里的一切东西看作以因果关系为条件呢，抑或也可以假设世界里有一个自由的存在者，亦即行动的一个绝对开端?最后的第四个二律背反是这样一个两难选择，即世界究竟有没有一个原因?

The method which Kant follows in discussing these antinomies is as follows. He puts the two propositions implied in the dilemma over against each other as thesis and antithesis, and seeks to prove both: that is to say he tries to exhibit them as inevitably issuing from reflection on the question. He particularly protests against the charge of being a special pleader and of grounding his reasoning on illusions. Speaking honestly, however, the arguments which Kant offers for his thesis and antithesis are mere shams of demonstration. The thing to be proved is invariably implied in the assumption he starts from, and the speciousness of his proofs is only due to his prolix and apagogic mode of procedure. Yet it was, and still is, a great achievement for the Critical Philosophy when it exhibited these antinomies: for in this way it gave some expression (at first certainly subjective and unexplained) to the actual unity of those categories which are kept persistently separate by the understanding. The first of the cosmological antinomies, for example, implies a recognition of the doctrine that space and time present a discrete as well as a continuous aspect: whereas the old metaphysic, laying exclusive emphasis on the continuity, had been led to treat the world as unlimited in space and time. It is quite correct to say that we can go beyond every definite space and beyond every definite time: but it is no less correct that space and time are real and actual only when they are defined or specialised into ‘here’ and ‘now’ — a specialisation which is involved in the very notion of them. The same observations apply to the rest of the antinomies. Take, for example, the antinomy of freedom and necessity. The main gist of it is that freedom and necessity as understood by abstract thinkers are not independently real, as these thinkers suppose, but merely ideal factors (moments) of the true freedom and the true necessity, and that to abstract and isolate either conception is to make it false.

康德在讨论这些二律背反时，遵循着这样一种方法： 他首先把包含在其中的相互对立的规定当作正题和反题而对立起来，然后再对二者分别加以证明，也就是说，他试图表明二者都是相关反思的必然结论，而这就明确地洗刷了他仿佛是通过诡辩而偏袒一方的嫌疑。 但实际上，康德为那些正题和反题提出的证明必须被看作纯粹的虚假证明，因为他的前提总是已经包含着一些本来应当加以证明的东西，而他从这些前提出发，仅仅通过一种烦琐的反证法而制造出证明的假象。 但无论如何，康德能提出这些二律背反，这终究是批判哲学的一个极为重要的和值得称道的成果，因为他(虽然起初只是以主观的和直接的方式)明确地说出了知性坚持割裂的那些规定的事实上的统一体。 比如，第一个宇宙论二律背反已经包含着一点，即空间和时间不仅应当被看作延续的，而且应当被看作区间性的，反之旧的形而上学却是止步于单纯的延续性，进而认为世界在空间和时间上是不受限定的。 认为每一个已规定的空间和每一个已规定的时间都可以被超越，这是完全正确的； 反过来，认为空间和时间只有通过它们的规定性(亦即作为“这里”和“这时”)才是现实的，以及这个规定性就包含在它们的概念里面，这同样是正确的。同样的道理也适用于另外几个二律背反。比如自由和必然性的二律背反其实是这个意思，即知性所理解的自由和必然性实际上只不过是真正的自由和真正的必然性的观念性环节，因此二者在分裂的情况下不具有真理。

§ 49

[c] The third object of the Reason is God (§ 36): he also must be known and defined in terms of thought. But in comparison with an unalloyed identity, every defining term as such seems to the understanding to be only a limit and a negation: every reality accordingly must be taken as limitless, i.e. undefined. Accordingly God, when he is defined to be the sum of all realities, the most real of beings, turns into a mere abstract. And the only term under which that most real of real things can be defined is that of Being itself the height of abstraction. These are two elements, abstract identity, on one hand, which is spoken of in this place as the notion; and Being on the other which Reason seeks to unify. And their union is the Ideal of Reason.

第三个应当被认识，或者说应当以思维的方式被规定的理性对象是上帝(§36)。在知性看来，相对于单纯的同一性而言，全部规定都仅仅是一个限制，一个严格意义上的否定；相应地，全部实在性都只应当被看作无限制的或无规定的，于是上帝作为全部实在性的总括，作为最实在的本质，成为单纯的抽象东西，而他的规定也只剩下一个同样完全抽象的规定性，即存在。抽象的同一性(在这里也被称作概念)和存在是理性想要联合起来的两个环节；这个联合是理性的理想。

§ 50

To carry out this unification two ways or two forms are admissible. Either we may begin with Being and proceed to the abstractum of Thought: or the movement may begin with the abstraction and end in Being.

这个联合容许两个途径或形式：也就是说，人们既可以从存在出发过渡到思维中的抽象东西，也可以反过来从抽象的东西出发过渡到存在。

We shall, in the first place, start from Being. But Being, in its natural aspect, presents itself to view as a Being of infinite variety, a World in all its plentitude. And this world may be regarded in two ways: first, as a collection of innumerable unconnected facts; and second, as a collection of innumerable facts in mutual relation, giving evidence of design. The first aspect is emphasised in the Cosmological proof; the latter in the proofs of Natural Theology. Suppose now that this fullness of being passes under the agency of thought. Then it is stripped of its isolation and unconnectedness, and viewed as a universal and absolutely necessary being which determines itself and acts by general purposes or laws. And this necessary and self-determined being, different from the being at the commencement, is God.

当人们以存在为开端，存在作为直接的东西就呈现为一个无限丰富地已规定的存在，呈现为一个充盈的世界。这个世界进而可以被规定为无穷多的偶然事物的集合(这是宇宙论证明的做法),或被规定为无穷多的目的和合目的的关系的集合(这是自然神学证明的做法)。——所谓去思考这个充盈的存在，就是剥离它的个别性和偶然性等形式，把它理解为一个普遍的、本身就必然的、并且按照普遍的目的而规定着自身和活动着的存在；这个存在不同于起初的那个存在，而是上帝。

The main force of Kant’s criticism on this process attacks it for being a syllogising, i.e. a transition. Perceptions, and that aggregate of perceptions we call the world, exhibit as they stand no traces of that universality which they afterwards receive from the purifying act of thought. The empirical conception of the world therefore gives no warrant for the idea of universality. And so any attempt on the part of thought to ascend from the empirical conception of the world to God is checked by the argument of Hume (as in the paralogisms, § 47), according to which we have no right to think sensations, that is, to elicit universality and necessity from them.

——康德在批判这个过程时，主要强调的是，这是一个推论或过渡。也就是说，知觉及其集合(亦即世界)本身严格说来并没有表现出思维通过净化那些内容而得出的普遍性，因此这个普遍性不能以那个经验的世界表象为依据。就[131]此而言，康德是站在休谟的立场上否认思想能够从经验的世界表象出发提升到上帝(就像在谬误推论那里一样，参阅§47)。——这个立场不允许去思考知觉，亦即不允许从知觉里提炼出普遍的和必然的东西。

Man is essentially a thinker: and therefore sound Common Sense, as well as Philosophy, will not yield up their right of rising to God from and out of the empirical view of the world. The only basis on which this rise is possible is the thinking study of the world, not the bare sensuous, animal, attuition of it. Thought and thought alone has eyes for the essence, substance, universal power, and ultimate design of the world. And what men call the proofs of God’s existence are, rightly understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the mind, the course of thought thinking the data of the senses. The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought. Say there must be no such passage, and you say there is to be no thinking. And in sooth, animals make no such transition. They never get further than sensation and the perception of the senses, and in consequence they have no religion.

[说明]正因为人是思维着的，所以无论是健全的人类知性还是哲学都不会剥夺我们依据经验的世界观并由之出发提升到上帝的权利。为了做到这个提升，唯一的办法是以思维的方式，而不是仅仅以感性的、动物的方式去观察世界。对思维而言，而且只有对思维而言，本质或实体才是世界的普遍权力和目的规定。所谓的对于上帝存在的证明只不过是去描述和分析精神的内在进程，而精神是思维着的精神，并且思考着感性的东西。思维之提升到感性东西之上，思维之超越有限者而走向无限者，思维之打破感性东西的锁链而进入超感性东西的飞跃，所有这一切都是思维本身的活动，仅仅是思维的过渡。没有这样的过渡，就等于说没有思维。实际上，动物就没有这样的过渡；它们止步于感觉和直观；因此它们也没有宗教。

Both on general grounds, and in the particular case, there are two remarks to be made upon the criticism of this exaltation in thought. The first remark deals with the question of form. When the exaltation is exhibited in a syllogistic process, in the shape of what we call proofs of the being of God, these reasonings cannot but start from some sort of theory of the world, which makes it an aggregate either of contingent facts or of final causes and relations involving design. The merely syllogistic thinker may deem this starting-point a solid basis and suppose that it remains throughout in the same empirical light, left at last as it was at the first. In this case, the bearing of the beginning upon the conclusion to which it leads has a purely affirmative aspect, as if we were only reasoning from one thing which is and continues to be, to another thing which in like manner is. But the great error is to restrict our notions of the nature of thought to its form in understanding alone. To think the phenomenal world rather means to recast its form, and transmute it into a universal. And thus the action of thought has also a negative effect upon its basis: and the matter of sensation, when it receives the stamp of universality, at once loses its first and phenomenal shape. By the removal and negation of the shell, the kernel within the sense-percept is brought to the light (§§ 13 and 23). And it is because they do not, with sufficient prominence, express the negative features implied in the exaltation of the mind from the world to God that the metaphysical proofs of the being of a God are defective interpretations and descriptions of the process. If the world is only a sum of incidents, it follows that it is also deciduous and phenomenal, in esse and posse null. That upward spring of the mind signifies that the being which the world has is only a semblance, no real being, no absolute truth; it signifies that, beyond and above that appearance, truth abides in God, so that true being is another name for God. The process of exaltation might thus appear to be transition and to involve a means, but it is not a whit less true that every trace of transition and means is absorbed; since the world, which might have seemed to be the means of reaching God, is explained to be a nullity. Unless the being of the world is nullified, the point d’appui for the exaltation is lost. In this way the apparent means vanishes, and the process of derivation is cancelled in the very act by which it proceeds. It is the affirmative aspect of this relation, as supposed to subsist between two things, either of which is as much as the other, which Jacobi mainly has in his eye when he attacks the demonstrations of the understanding. Justly censuring them for seeking conditions (i.e. the world) for the unconditioned, he remarks that the Infinite or God must on such a method be presented as dependent and derivative. But that elevation, as it takes place in the mind, serves to correct this semblance: in fact, it has no other meaning than to correct that semblance. Jacobi, however, failed to recognise the genuine nature of essential thought – by which it cancels the mediation in the very act of mediating; and consequently, his objection, though it tells against the merely ‘reflective’ understanding, is false when applied to thought as a whole, and in particular to reasonable thought.

关于康德对思维的这种提升的批判，需要分别指出一个普遍要点和一个特殊要点。第一，当思维采取推论的形式(所谓的对于上帝存在的证明),那么其出发点是这样一种世界观，即以某种方式把世界规定为偶[132]然事物的集合或目的和合目的的关系的集合。当思维进行推论时，这个出发点似乎是一个坚实的基础，并且和这个起初的材料一样始终属于经验的范围。这样一来，出发点和将要达到的终点之间的关系被想象为一个纯粹肯定的关系，即从一个始终存在着的东西推论到另一个同样如此的东西。但这里的重大错误在于企图单凭这个知性形式就认识到思维的本性。毋宁说，所谓对经验世界加以思考，在本质上是指改变这个世界的经验形式，将其转化为一个普遍者；思维同时对那个基础展开一个否定的活动；当知觉到的材料接受普遍性的规定，就不再具有其起初的经验形态。通过清除和否定外壳，知觉的内在内涵凸显出来(参阅§13和§23)。形而上学在证明上帝的存在时，之所以只能以不完满的方式去解释和描述精神从世界到上帝的提升，就是因为它没有表达出，或更确切地说，没有提炼出包含在这个提升中的否定环节，换言之，既然世界是偶然的，那么这就意味着它仅仅是一个摇摇欲坠的、显现着的、本身虚无的东西。精神的提升的意义在于，世界虽然具有存在，但这只是一个假象，不是真实的存在或绝对的真理，毋宁说，绝对真理仅仅属于那个位于现象彼岸的上帝，只有上帝才是真实的存在。这个提升既是过渡和中介活动，也是对于过渡和中介活动的扬弃，因为那个看上去能够为上帝提供中介的东西，亦即世界，毋宁被宣告为虚无的东西；只有通过否定世界的存在，才能够确保那个提升，也就是说，提供中介的东西消失了，随之这个中介活动在中介活动自身之内被扬弃了。——当雅各比反对知性的证明时，[133]主要就是强调知性把那个纯粹肯定的关系当作两个存在者之间的关系；他公允地指责知性的那个做法，即通过给无条件者寻找条件(世界)而把无条件者(上帝)想象为一个有根据的和有所依赖的东西。但精神里的那个提升本身就纠正了这个假象；或更确切地说，提升的整个内涵就在于将这个假象带上正轨。雅各比不知道，作为本质的思维的真正本性就是要在中介活动之内扬弃中介活动本身，就此而言，如果他的指责只是针对反思的知性，那么这是正确的，但如果这个指责是针对全部思维，进而也针对理性思维，那么这就错了。

To explain what we mean by the neglect of the negative factor in thought, we may refer by way of illustration to the charges of Pantheism and Atheism brought against the doctrines of Spinoza. The absolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of absolute spirit, and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined as absolute spirit. But when the definition in Spinoza is said to identify the world with God, and to confound God with nature and the finite world, it is implied that the finite world possesses a genuine actuality and affirmative reality. If this assumption be admitted, of course a union of God with the world renders God completely finite, and degrades Him to the bare finite and adventitious congeries of existence. But there are two objections to be noted. In the first place Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God with the world, but as the union of thought with extension, that is, with the material world. And secondly, even if we accept this awkward popular statement as to this unity, it would still be true that the system of Spinoza was not Atheism but Acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in true reality. A philosophy which affirms that God and God alone is should not be stigmatised as atheistic, when even those nations which worship the ape, the cow, or images of stone and brass, are credited with some religion. But as things stand the imagination of ordinary men feels a vehement reluctance to surrender its dearest conviction, that this aggregate of finitude, which it calls a world, has actual reality; and to hold that there is no world is a way of thinking they are fain to believe impossible, or at least much less possible than to entertain the idea that there is no God. Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of the world.

我们不妨拿斯宾诺莎主义被指责为泛神论和无神论这件事情作为例子来说明对于否定环节的忽视。斯宾诺莎的绝对实体诚然还不是绝对精神，因此我们有理由要求上帝被规定为绝对精神。但人们这样想象斯宾诺莎的观点，仿佛他把上帝和自然界或有限世界混淆起来，把世界当作上帝，而这就假定有限世界具有真正的现实性或肯定的实在性。按照这个假定，主张上帝和世界的统一体当然意味着把上帝彻底地有限化，把他降格为一个单纯有限的、外在杂多的实存。但实际上斯宾诺莎并没有把上帝定义为和世界是一个统一体，而是主张上帝是思维和广延(物质世界)的统一体。关键在于，哪怕我们接受斯宾诺莎起初关于这个统一体的异常笨拙的说法，也可以发现，在斯宾诺莎的体系里，世界仅仅被规定为一个现象，不具有现实的实在性，因此这个体系与其说是无神论，不如说是[134]无世界论(Akosmimus)。如果一种哲学主张上帝存在并且只有上帝存在，那么她至少不应当被称作无神论，更何况连那些崇拜猴子、母牛、石像和铜像的民族，我们也都承认它们拥有宗教。但在表象的意义上，要让表象放弃自己的前提，不再认为有限事物的这种堆积(亦即所谓的“世界”)具有现实的实在性，这确实是强人所难。人们在听到“没有世界”之类说法时，总觉得这是完全不可能的，至少在他们看来，这件事情的可能性比设想"没有上帝"的可能性要低得多。令人遗憾的是，人们总是相信，一个体系否认上帝比否认世界更为容易；他们总觉得否认上帝是一件比否认世界更情有可原的事情。

The second remark bears on the criticism of the material propositions to which that elevation in thought in the first instance leads. If these ‘propositions have for their predicate such terms as substance of the world, its necessary essence, cause which regulates and directs it according to design, they are certainly inadequate to express what is or ought to be understood by God. Yet apart from the trick of adopting a preliminary popular conception of God, and criticising a result by this assumed standard, it is certain that these characteristics have great value, and are necessary factors in the idea of God. But if we wish in this way to bring before thought the genuine idea of God, and give its true value and expression to the central truth, we must be careful not to start from a subordinate level of facts. To speak of the ‘merely contingent’ things of the world is a very inadequate description of the premises.

第二个要点涉及对于思维提升首先赢得的内涵的批判。这个内涵如果只是立足于世界的实体、世界的必然的本质、一个安排和指导着世界的目的因等规定，那么当然不符合我们关于上帝已有的或应有的理解。但如果我们暂不考虑那个做法，即不是首先以上帝的一个表象为前提，然后按照这个前提去评价一个结果，那么可以说那些规定已经具有重大价值，并且是上帝的理念里的必然环节。为了通过这条途径去思考内涵的真实规定，去思考上帝的真实理念，我们当然切不可在低级的内容里寻找出发 点。世界上的纯粹偶然的事物是一个极为抽象的规定。

The organic structures, and the evidence they afford of mutual adaptation, belong to a higher province, the province of animated nature. But even without taking into consideration the possible blemish which the study of animated nature and of the other teleological aspects of existing things may contract from the pettiness of the final causes, and from puerile instances of them and their bearings, merely animated nature is, at the best, incapable of supplying the material for a truthful expression to the idea to God. God is more than life: he is Spirit. And therefore if the thought of the Absolute takes a starting-point for its rise, and desires to take the nearest, the most true and adequate starting-point will be found in the nature of spirit alone.

有机事物及其各[135]种目的规定属于一个更高的范围，属于生命。遗憾的是，人们在考察有生命的自然界以及各种现有事物与目的的关联时，却总是用一些微不足道的具体目的，甚至用一些幼稚的关于目的及其关联的理解，玷污了这项工作，更何况单凭有生命的自然界本身还不足以让我们把握到上帝的理念的真实规定；上帝不只是有生命的，他是精神。对于以绝对者为对象的思维而言，如果思维抓住一个出发点并且想要抓住下一个出发点，那么唯有精神性自然界才是最尊贵和最真实的出发点。

§ 51

The other way of unification by which to realise the Ideal of Reason is to set out from the abstractum of Thought and seek to characterise it: for which purpose Being is the only available term. This is the method of the Ontological proof. The opposition, here presented from a merely subjective point of view, lies between Thought and Being; whereas in the first way of junction, being is common to the two sides of the antithesis, and the contrast lies only between its individualisation and universality. Understanding meets this second way with what is implicitly the same objection as it made to the first. It denied that the empirical involves the universal; so it denies that the universal involves the specialisation, which specialisation in this instance is being. In other words it says: Being cannot be deduced from the notion by any analysis.

另一条借以实现理想的联合途径，就是从思维的抽象东西出发推进到那个别无选择的规定，即存在；——这就是对于上帝的定在的本体论证明。这里出现的对立是思维和存在的对立，因为在第一条途径里，存在是对立双方共有的，因此对立只涉及个别东西和普遍者的区别。本身而言，知性在这另一条途径上面临的情况和前面是一样的，也就是说，正如经验的东西不包含着普遍者，反过来，普遍者同样不包含着已规定的东西，而已规定的东西在这里就是存在。换言之，从概念里面不能推导或分析出 存在。

The uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which attended Kant’s criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To explain the difference between thought and being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns, which, for anything it matters to the notion, are the same hundred whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man’s purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not on that account actual; that mental representation, and even notional comprehension, always falls short of being. Still it may not unfairly be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of notion is given to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, those who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference between Being and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition more trite than this? But after all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or however else it may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which marks everything finite: its being in time and space is discrepant from its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can only be ‘thought as existing’; his notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God.

[说明]康德对于本体论证明的批判之所以能够受到无条件的接纳和拥护，无疑得益于他为了澄清思维和存在的区别而选取的那个例子，即一百塔勒虽然不管仅仅是可能的还是现实的，就概念而言都是一百塔勒，但对我的财富状况而言，[可能性和现实性的]这个区别却构成了一个根本区别。——没有什么比“我所思考或设想的东西并不因此是现实的”[136]或"表象活动或概念还不足以确保存在"之类思想更加清晰明白的了。——但是，且不说把一百塔勒之类东西称作概念乃是一种没有文化的表现，关键在于，那些整天婆婆妈妈地拿着"思维和存在是有差异的"去反对哲学理念的人，竟然以为唯独哲学家不知道这件事；事实上还有比这更加肤浅的知识吗?此外值得注意的是，当人们谈到上帝时，这个对象完全不同于一百塔勒乃至任何一个特殊的概念、表象或无论什么名目的东西。实际上，一切有限者都是并且仅仅是这样的东西，即它们的定在和它们的概念是有差异的。反之上帝显然应当是一个只能“被思维为存在着"的东西，在这里，概念在自身之内包含着存在。恰恰是概念和存在的这个统一体构成了上帝的概念。

If this were all, we should have only a formal expression of the divine nature which would not really go beyond a statement of the nature of the notion itself. And that the notion, in its most abstract terms, involves being is plain. For the notion, whatever other determination it may receive, is at least reference back on itself, which results by abolishing the intermediation, and thus is immediate. And what is that reference to self, but being? Certainly it would be strange if the notion, the very inmost of mind, if even the ‘Ego’, or above all the concrete totality we call God, were not rich enough to include so poor a category as being, the very poorest and most abstract of all. For, if we look at the thought it holds, nothing can be more insignificant than being. And yet there may be something still more insignificant than being that which at first sight is perhaps supposed to be, an external and sensible existence, like that of the paper lying before me. However, in this matter, nobody proposes to speak of the sensible existence of a limited and perishable thing. Besides, the petty stricture of the Kritik that ‘thought and being are different’ can at most molest the path of the human mind from the thought of God to the certainty that he is: it cannot take it away. It is this process of transition, depending on the absolute inseparability of the thought of God from his being, for which its proper authority has been revindicated in the theory of faith or immediate knowledge — whereof hereafter.

当然，上帝还有一个形式上的规定，因此这个规定实际上仅仅包含着概念本身的本性。但很显然，概念即便在其完全抽象的意义上也已经在自身之内包含着存在。因为无论我们如何规定概念，概念至少都是通过扬弃中介活动而显露出来的，因而本身是一个直接的自身关联；但存在无非就是这样的东西。——不得不说，天底之下最荒谬的事情莫过于，精神的这个至深内核(亦即概念)或自我乃至具体的总体性(亦即上帝)是如此的荒芜，竟至于不能在自身之内包含着诸如“存在”之类贫乏的、甚至最贫乏和最抽象的规定。就内涵而言，没有比“存在”更微不足道的思想对象了。当然，如果人们在谈到“存在”时首先想到的是我面前的这张纸之类外在的、感性的实存，那么这是更加微不足道的；但人们根本不屑于谈论一个受限制的、转瞬即逝的物之类感性的实存。——此外，康德的批判大谈"思想和存在是有差异的"这一肤浅的事实，这充其量只能干扰人心从上帝的思想出发走向确信上帝存在的过程，但不能杜绝这个过程。这个过渡，即上帝的思想和上帝的存在的绝对不可分性，在直接知识或信仰的观点下重新获得了合法性。关于这一点，后面还会加以讨论。

§ 52

In this way thought, at its highest pitch, has to go outside for any determinateness; and although it is continually termed Reason, is out-and-out abstract thinking. And the result of all is that Reason supplies nothing beyond the formal unity required to simplify and systematise experiences; it is a canon, not an organon, of truth, and can furnish only a criticism of knowledge, not a doctrine of the infinite. In its final analysis this criticism is summed up in the assertion that in strictness thought is only the indeterminate unity and the action of this indeterminate unity.

通过这个方式，规定性对于达到其顶点的思维而言仍然是某种外在的东西；它始终只是一个完全抽象的思维，并且在这种情况下始终被称作理性。总而言之，理性能够提供的无非是经验的简化和体系化所需的形式化统一体，它是真理的公则(Kanon),不是真理的工具(Organon),不能提供一种有关无限者的理论，只能提供对于知识的批判。分析到最后，这个批判可以归结为这样一个论断：思维本身仅仅是一个无规定的统一体，仅仅是这个无规定的统一体的活动。

Kant undoubtedly held reason to be the faculty of the unconditioned but if reason be reduced to abstract identity only, it by implication renounces its unconditionality and is in reality no better than empty understanding. For reason is unconditioned only in so far as its character and quality are not due to an extraneous and foreign content, only in so far as it is self-characterising, and thus, in point of content, is its own master. Kant, however, expressly explains that the action of reason consists solely in applying the categories to systematise the matter given by perception, i.e. to place it in an outside order, under the guidance of the principle of non-contradiction.

[附释]康德虽然把理性看作一种以无限者为对象的能力，但如果理性仅仅被归结为抽象的同一性，同时也就意味着放弃了自己的无条件性，而这样一来，理性实际上无非是空洞的知性。理性只有在这种情况下才是无条件的，即不是受一个外面的陌生内容所规定，而是自己规定自己，进而在它的内容里安然于自身。但康德明确指出，理性的活动仅仅在于应用范畴把知觉提供的材料加以体系化，亦即赋予材料一个外在的秩序，而理性在这里坚持的原则只不过是无矛盾原则。

§ 53

(b) The Practical Reason is understood by Kant to mean a thinking Will, i.e. a Will that determines itself on universal principles. Its office is to give objective, imperative laws of freedom laws, that is, which state what ought to happen. The warrant for thus assuming thought to be an activity which makes itself felt objectively, that is, to be really a Reason, is the alleged possibility of proving practical freedom by experience, that is, of showing it in the phenomenon of selfconsciousness. This experience in consciousness is at once met by all that the Necessitarian produces from contrary experience, particularly by the sceptical induction (employed among others by Hume) from the endless diversity of what men regard as right and duty i.e. from the diversity apparent in those professedly objective laws of freedom.

b)在康德看来，实践理性是一个以普遍的方式自己规定着自己的意志，亦即思维着的意志。它应当颁布命令式的、客观的自由规律，即指出什么事情应当发生。康德之所以有理由把思维看作一个客观地进行规定的活动(亦即实际上看作同一个理性),是因为实践自由能够通过经验而得到证明，亦即在自我意识的现象中得到证实。针对意识中的这个经验，决定论同样从经验出发得出一切相反的结论，尤其是怀疑主义(包括休谟)通过归纳人们的权利和义务(亦即那些应当客观化的自由规律)而指出它们的无限差异性。

§ 54

What, then, is to serve as the law which the Practical Reason embraces and obeys, and as the criterion in its act of selfdetermination? There is no rule at hand but the same abstract identity of understanding as before: there must be no contradiction in the act of self- determination. Hence the Practical Reason never shakes off the formalism which is represented as the climax of the Theoretical Reason.

实践思维为自己制定的规律，自身规定活动的标准，其依据的仍然只能是知性的那个抽象的同一性，即规定活动不应当包含着矛盾；——在这种情况下，实践理性并没有超越那种作为理论理性之最终基石的形式主义。

But this Practical Reason does not confine the universal principle of the Good to its own inward regulation: it first becomes practical, in the true sense of the word, when it insists on the Good being manifested in the world with an outward objectivity, and requires that the thought shall be objective throughout, and not merely subjective. We shall speak of this postulate of the Practical Reason afterwards.

但这种实践理性并不是仅仅把那个普遍的规定亦即"善"设定在自身之内，毋宁说，它之所以真正是实践的，是因为它要求善具有世间的定在，具有外在的客观性，也就是说，要求思想不仅是主观的，而且是完全客观的。关于实践理性的这个悬设，后面也会加以讨论。

The free self-determination which Kant denied to the speculative, he has expressly vindicated for the practical reason. To many minds this particular aspect of the Kantian philosophy made it welcome; and that for good reasons. To estimate rightly what we owe to Kant in the matter, we ought to set before our minds the form of practical philosophy and in particular of ‘moral philosophy’ which prevailed in his time. It may be generally described as a system of Eudaemonism, which, when asked what man’s chief end ought to be, replied Happiness. And by happiness Eudaemonism understood the satisfaction of the private appetites, wishes, and wants of the man: thus raising the contingent and particular into a principle for the will and its actualisation. To this Eudaemonism, which was destitute of stability and consistency, and which left the ‘door and gate’ wide open for every whim and caprice, Kant opposed the practical reason, and thus emphasised the need for a principle of will which should be universal and lay the same obligation on all. The theoretical reason, as has been made evident in the preceding paragraphs, is identified by Kant with the negative faculty of the infinite; and as it has no positive content of its own, it is restricted to the function of detecting the finitude of experiential knowledge. To the practical reason, on the contrary, he has expressly allowed a positive infinity, by ascribing to the will the power of modifying itself in universal modes, i.e. by thought. Such a power the will undoubtedly has: and it is well to remember that man is free only in so far as he possesses it and avails himself of it in his conduct. But a recognition of the existence of this power is not enough and does not avail to tell us what are the contents of the will or practical reason. Hence to say that a man must make the Good the content of his will raises the question, what that content is, and what are the means of ascertaining what good is. Nor does one get over the difficulty by the principle that the will must be consistent with itself, or by the precept to do duty for the sake of duty.

[附释]康德把从理论理性那里夺走的东西——自由的自身规定——明确地托付给实践理性。康德哲学主要是凭借这个方面而广 受赞誉，而这是完全合理的。为了公允地评价康德在这个方面作出的贡献，人们必须首先回忆一下实践哲学(确切地说道德哲学)的那个形态，即康德当时面临的那个占据支配地位的形态。简言之，这个[139]形态就是幸福论体系，其对于"人的使命是什么"这一问题的答复是：人必须把自己的幸福设定为目标。至于什么是幸福，按照人们的理解，它就是各种特殊的偏好、愿望、需要等等的满足，而这就把偶然的和片面的东西当作意志及其行为的本原。康德用实践理性去反抗这种缺乏任何固定的支撑点、并且为全部随心所欲敞开大门的幸福论，从而明确表明需要一个普遍的、对所有的人都具有同等约束力的意志规定。正如前面几节已经指出的，理论理性在康德看来仅仅是一种以无限者为对象的否定的能力，没有自己的肯定的内容，只能局 限于指出知性知识的有限性。反之康德明确承认实践理性的肯定的无限性，也就是说，他宣称意志能够以普遍的方式或者说以思维的方式自己规定自己。诚然，意志确实具有这个能力，而且这里有一个极为重要的观点，即人只有在具有这个能力并且在其活动中使用这个能力时才是自由的；但即便如此，也仍然没有回答意志或实践理性的内容是什么的问题。因此，当康德说人应当把善当作他的意志的内容时，我们马上就会追问内容是什么，亦即追问这个内容的规定性。单凭意志的自身一致性原则和“你应当为了义务而履行义务”这一要求，人们仍然是寸步难行的。

§ 55

(c) The Reflective Power of Judgment is invested by Kant with the function of an Intuitive Understanding. That is to say, whereas the particulars had hitherto appeared, so far as the universal or abstract identity was concerned, adventitious and incapable of being deduced from it, the Intuitive Understanding apprehends the particulars as moulded and formed by the universal itself. Experience presents such universalised particulars in the products of Art and of organic nature.

c)康德认为反思的判断力具有一种直观式知性的原则，也就是说，虽然特殊东西对普遍者(抽象的同一性)而言是偶然的，而且不能从中推导出来，但在反思的判断力里却可以通过这个普遍者本身而得到规定，——这些情况是在艺术作品和有机自然界的产物里可以经验到的。

The capital feature in Kant’s Criticism of the Judgment is, that in it he gave a representation and a name, if not even an intellectual expression, to the Idea. Such a representation, as an Intuitive Understanding, or an inner adaptation, suggests a universal which is at the same time apprehended as essentially a concrete unity. It is in these apercus alone that the Kantian philosophy rises to the speculative height. Schiller, and others, have found in the idea of artistic beauty, where thought and sensuous conception have grown together into one, a way of escape from the abstract and separatist understanding. Others have found the same relief in the perception and consciousness of life and of living things, whether that life be natural or intellectual. The work of Art, as well as the living individual, is, it must be owned, of limited content. But in the postulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose in the final purpose of the world conceived as realised, Kant has put before us the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called the laziness of thought, when dealing with the supreme Idea, finds a too easy mode of evasion in the ‘ought to be’: instead of the actual realisation of the ultimate end, it clings hard to the disjunction of the notion from reality. Yet if thought will not think the ideal realised, the senses and the intuition can at any rate see it in the present reality of living organisms and of the beautiful in Art. And consequently Kant’s remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead the mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea.

[说明]《判断力批判》的卓越之处在于，康德在其中明确说出了理念的表象乃至思想。直觉式知性、内在的合目的性等等的表象是一个普遍者，同时这个普遍者被看作本身即具体的。因此康德哲学唯有在这些表象里才表明自己是思辨的。许多人，尤其是席勒，已经通过"艺术美"、"思想和感性表象的具体的统一体"等理念而逃脱了分裂式知性的抽象东西，——另一些人则是通过对于生命力——无论是自然的生命力还是理智的生命力——的直观和意识而做到了这一点。——诚然，艺术作品和有生命的个体都是受限于自己的内容；但康德在自然界或必然性与自由目的的悬设的和谐里，在被设想为已实现的世界终极目的里，提出了一个甚至就内容而言也无所不包的理念。但"思想的懒惰"恰如其名，在面对这个最高理念时却把"应当"当作一条捷径，即执着于概念和实在性的分裂，不承认终极目的可以得到现实的实现。与此相反，有生命的有机组织和艺术美的当下在场甚至已经给感官和直观揭示出了理想的现实性。就此而言，康德关于这些对象的反思尤其适合于引导意识去把握和思考具体的理念。

§ 56

We are thus led to conceive a different relation between the universal of understanding and the particular of perception, than that on which the theory of the Theoretical and Practical Reason is founded. But while this is so, it is not supplemented by a recognition that the former is the genuine relation and the very truth. Instead of that, the unity (of universal with particular) is accepted only as it exists in finite phenomena, and is adduced only as a fact of experience. Such experience, at first only personal, may come from two sources. It may spring from Genius, the faculty which produces ‘aesthetic ideas’; meaning by aesthetic ideas, the picture-thoughts of the free imagination which subserve an idea and suggest thoughts, although their content is not expressed in a notional form, and even admits of no such expression. It may also be due to Taste, the feeling of congruity between the free play of intuition or imagination and the uniformity of understanding.

知性中的普遍者和直观中的特殊东西的关系曾经是理论理性学说和实践理性学说的基础，而康德在这里提出了关于二者的另一种关系的思想。尽管如此，康德还没有认识到这种关系是真实的关系，甚至是真理本身，而是仅仅把这个存在于有限的现象中的统一体接纳下来，并且在经验[141]中予以揭示。最初在主体中提供这类经验的，一方面是天才或生产出审美理念的能力，也就是说，天才通过自由的想象力生产出一些表象，这些表象服务于一个理念，并且让人思考这个理念，但这样的内容并没有在个概念中表达出来，或者说不可能在其中表达出来，——另一方面是鉴赏力判断，亦即察觉到自由的直观或表象与合乎规律的知性的和谐一致。

§ 57

The principle by which the Reflective faculty of Judgment regulates and arranges the products of animated nature is described as the End or final cause the notion in action, the universal at once determining and determinate in itself. At the same time Kant is careful to discard the conception of external or finite adaptation, in which the End is only an adventitious form for the means and material in which it is realised. In the living organism, on the contrary, the final cause is a moulding principle and an energy immanent in the matter, and every member is in its turn a means as well as an end.

再者，反思的判断力原则被规定为有生命的自然产物的目的，即一个活动着的概念，一个内在地已规定的和进行规定的普遍者。与此同时，康德清除了外在的或有限的合目的性的表象，因为在这种表象中，目的对于实现目的的手段和材料而言仅仅是一个外在的形式。反之在有生命的东西里，目的是一种内在于材料的规定和活动，而且全部环节都既是彼此的手段，也是彼此的目的。

§ 58

Such an Idea evidently radically transforms the relation which the understanding institutes between means and ends, between subjectivity and objectivity. And yet in the face of this unification, the End or design is subsequently explained to be a cause which exists and acts subjectively, i.e. as our idea only: and teleology is accordingly explained to be only a principle of criticism, purely personal to our understanding.

虽然在这样的理念中，目的和手段、主观性和客观性之类知性关系被扬弃了，但康德重新陷入矛盾，宣称目的是一个仅仅作为表象，亦即作为主观的东西而存在着和活动着的原因；——相应地，康德又宣称目的规定仅仅是一个隶属于我们的知性的评判原则。

After the Critical philosophy had settled that Reason can know phenomena only, there would still have been an option for animated nature between two equally subjective modes of thought. Even according to Kant’s own exposition, there would have been an obligation to admit, in the case of natural productions, a knowledge not confined to the categories of quality, cause and effect, composition, constituents, and so on. The principle of inward adaptation or design, had it been kept to and carried out in scientific application, would have led to a different and a higher method of observing nature.

[说明]既然批判哲学已经得出“理性只能认识现象”这一结论，那么人们在看待有生命的自然界时，至少可以在两个同等主观的思维方式之[142]间进行选择，而且按照康德的阐述，人们本来就有责任不再仅仅依据质、原因和作用、复合、组成部分等范畴去认识自然产物。只要内在的合目的性原则在科学应用中得到坚持和发展，就将带来迥然不同的、更高级的观察自然产物的方式。

§ 59

If we adopt this principle, the Idea, when all limitations were removed from it, would appear as follows. The universality moulded by Reason, and described as the absolute and final end or the Good, would be realised in the world, and realised moreover by means of a third thing, the power which proposes this End as well as realises it that is, God. Thus in him, who is the absolute truth, those oppositions of universal and individual, subjective and objective, are solved and explained to be neither self-subsistent nor true.

假若理念按照这个原则处于完全不受限制的状态，那么理性所规定的普遍性、绝对终极目的、善就将在世界上得以实现，而且这是通过一个第三者，通过一个亲自设定并实现这个终极目的的权力——上帝——而得以实现。因此在上帝里，在这个绝对真理里，普遍性和个别性、主观性和客观性等等的对立都被消解了，并且被宣称为非独立和非真实的东西。

§ 60

But Good which is thus put forward as the final cause of the world has been already described as only our good, the moral law of our Practical Reason. This being so, the unity in question goes no further than make the state of the world and the course of its events harmonise with our moral standards. Besides, even with this limitation, the final cause, or Good, is a vague abstraction, and the same vagueness attaches to what is to be Duty. But, further, this harmony is met by the revival and reassertion of the antithesis, which it by its own principle had nullified. The harmony is then described as merely subjective, something which merely ought to be, and which at the same time is not real a mere article of faith, possessing a subjective certainty, but without truth, or that objectivity which is proper to the Idea. This contradiction may seem to be disguised by adjourning the realisation of the Idea to a future, to a time when the Idea will also be. But a sensuous condition like time is the reverse of a reconciliation of the discrepancy; and an infinite progression which is the corresponding image adopted by the understanding on the very face of it only repeats and re-enacts the contradiction.

但是，世界的终极目的所依托的善从一开始就仅仅被规定为我们的善，被规定为我们的实践理性的道德法则；这样一来，统一体无非是指世界上的状况和发生的事情与我们的道德性相一致*。伴随着这个限制，不但终极目的或善，就连所谓的义务，也都成为一个无规定的抽象东西。更有甚者，针对这个和谐，康德重新唤醒并主张那个在和谐的内容中被设定为非真实的对立，而这就导致和谐被规定为一个单纯主观的东西，——[143]被规定为一个仅仅应当存在，同时却不具有实在性的东西，——被规定为一个信仰，这个信仰只具有主观的确定性，却不具有真理，亦即不具有那个与理性相符合的客观性。——诚然，这个矛盾看起来可以这样加以掩饰，即把理念的实现托付给时间，托付给一个未来(那时理念也会存在),但诸如时间这样的感性条件毋宁是解决矛盾的反面，而且那个相应的知性表象，无限进展，直接地看来无非是被恒久地设定下来的矛盾本身。

A general remark may still be offered on the result to which the Critical philosophy led as to the nature of knowledge; a result which has grown one of the current ‘idols’ or axiomatic beliefs of the day. In every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant, the fundamental defect makes itself visible in the inconsistency of unifying at one moment what a moment before had been explained to be independent and therefore incapable of unification. And then, at the very moment after unification has been alleged to be the truth, we suddenly come upon the doctrine that the two elements, which, in their true status of unification, had been refused all independent subsistence, are only true and actual in their state of separation. Philosophising of this kind wants the little penetration needed to discover, that this shuffling only evidences how unsatisfactory each one of the two terms is. And it fails simply because it is incapable of bringing two thoughts together. (And in point of form there are never more than two.) It argues an utter want of consistency to say, on the one hand, that the understanding only knows phenomena, and, on the other, assert the absolute character of this knowledge, by such statements as ‘Cognition can go no further’; ‘Here is the natural and absolute limit of human knowledge.’ But ‘natural’ is the wrong word here. The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to such extent as they are not aware of their universal limit, or to such extent as their mode or quality is a limit from our point of view, and not from their own. No one knows, or even feels, that anything is a limit or defect, until he is at the same time above and beyond it. Living beings, for example, possess the privilege of pain which is denied to the inanimate: even with living beings, a single mode or quality passes into the feeling of a negative. For living beings as such possess within them a universal vitality, which overpasses and includes the single mode; and thus, as they maintain themselves in the negative of themselves, they feel the contradiction to exist within them. But the contradiction is within them only in so far as one and the same subject includes both the universality of their sense of life, and the individual mode which is in negation with it. This illustration will show how a limit or imperfection in knowledge comes to be termed a limit or imperfection, only when it is compared with the actually present Idea of the universal, of a total and perfect. A very little consideration might show that to call a thing finite or limited proves by implication the very presence of the infinite and unlimited, and that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is on this side in consciousness.

[说明]批判哲学针对认识活动的本性而得出的结论已经上升为我们这个时代的信念或普遍前提之一。关于这个结论，我们还可以作出一个总评。

任何二元论体系，尤其是康德的体系，都是通过前后不一贯而暴露出自己的根本缺陷，比如它前一秒钟刚宣称某些东西是独立的，亦即不可联合的，然后立即将它们联合起来。同样，它刚才还在宣称联合起来的东西是真实的，然后立即否认两个联合起来(并且将这个联合当作真理)的环节具有自为的持存，转而认为它们只有处于分裂的情况下才具有真理和现实性。这样的哲学思考完全没有意识到，这种反复无常的做法等于宣称每一个个别规定都是不能令人满意的，而它的缺陷就在于它根本没有能力把两个思想——因为就形式而言，只有两个思想——整合在一起。总的说来，其最严重的前后不一贯在于， 一方面承认知性只能认识现象， 另一方面宣称“认识活动不能更进一步"、"这是人类知识的自然的、绝对[144]的限制"等等， 借此主张这种认识活动是某种绝对的东西。 自然事物是受限制的，而它们之所以是自然事物，只是因为它们对自己的普遍的限制一无所知，以及它们的规定性仅仅是一个对我们而言，而不是对它们自己而言的限制。 只有当人超越某个东西时，才意识到、甚至感受到这个东西是一个限制或缺陷。 相比无生命的事物，有生命的事物的优越性在于能够感受到痛苦；对于有生命的事物而言，哪怕一个个别的规定性也会转变为对于一个否定者的感受，因为它们作为有生命的东西，本身具有一种普遍的、超越了个别东西的生命力，能够在它们自身的那个否定者里依然维系自身，并且感受到这个矛盾就存在于它们自身之内。 这个矛盾之所以存在于它们自身之内，只是因为同一个主体包含着两个东西， 即主体的普遍的生命感和与之相对立的否定的个别性。 同理，只有通过与普遍者、整全者、完满者的现成的理念的比较，认识活动的限制或缺陷才被规定为限制或缺陷。 简言之，只有浑浑噩噩的笨蛋不知道，每当我们把某些东西称作有限的、受限制的，这本身已经证明了无限的、不受限制的东西的现实的当下性， 而且只有当不受限定的东西内在于意识，我们才能够具有关于界限的知识。

The result however of Kant’s view of cognition suggests a second remark. The philosophy of Kant could have no influence on the method of the sciences. It leaves the categories and method of ordinary knowledge quite unmolested. Occasionally, it may be, in the first sections of a scientific work of that period, we find propositions borrowed from the Kantian philosophy; but the course of the treatise renders it apparent that these propositions were superfluous decoration, and that the few first pages might have been omitted without producing the least change in the empirical contents.

针对那个关于认识活动的结论，我们还可以进一步指出，康德哲学不可能对科学研究产生任何影响。康德哲学认为日常认识活动的范畴和方法是绝对不容置疑的。虽然当时的一些科学著作偶尔会引用康德哲学的几句话，但从整部著作来看，那些话只不过是一种冗余的装饰，即使我们[145]撕掉开篇的那几页，同样的经验内容依然会出现*。

We may next institute a comparison of Kant with the metaphysics of the empirical school. Natural plain Empiricism, though it unquestionably insists most upon sensuous perception, still allows a supersensible world or spiritual reality, whatever may be its structure and constitution, and whether derived from intellect, or from imagination, etc. So far as form goes, the facts of this supersensible world rest on the authority of mind, in the same way as the other facts embraced in empirical knowledge rest on the authority of external perception. But when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent, it turns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species of fact; it denies the independence of the thinking principle and of a spiritual world which develops itself in thought. Materialism or Naturalism, therefore, is the consistent and thoroughgoing system of Empiricism. In direct opposition to such an Empiricism, Kant asserts the principle of thought and freedom, and attaches himself to the first mentioned form of empirical doctrine, the general principles of which he never departed from. There is a dualism in his philosophy also. On one side stands the world of sensation, and of the understanding which reflects upon it. This world, it is true, he alleges to be a world of appearances. But that is only a title or formal description; for the source, the facts, and the modes of observation continue quite the same as in Empiricism. On the other side and independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of freedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysic, but emptied of all that it held, and without his being able to infuse into it anything new. For, in the Critical doctrine, thought, or, as it is there called, Reason, is divested of every specific form, and thus bereft of all authority. The main effect of the Kantian philosophy has been to revive the consciousness of Reason, or the absolute inwardness of thought. Its abstractness indeed prevented that inwardness from developing into anything, or from originating any special forms, whether cognitive principles or moral laws; but nevertheless it absolutely refused to accept or indulge anything possessing the character of an externality. Henceforth the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of the time.

具体说到康德哲学和形而上学化的经验论的比较，可以说朴素的经验论虽然坚持感性知觉，但同样承认一种精神性现实性或一个超感性世界，不管这个世界的内容具有哪些性质，也不管这个内容究竟是起源于思想还是起源于幻想，如此等等。就形式而言，这个内容得到了一种精神性权威的认证，正如经验知识的其他内容得到了外在知觉的权威的认证。但那种秉承前后一贯原则的反思的经验论反对这种有着终极的最高内容的二元论，并且否认有一个独立的思维原则和一个在其中独立发展的精神性世界。唯物主义、自然主义是经验论的前后一贯的体系。——康德哲学依据思维原则和自由原则坚决反对这种反思的经验论，同时继承了那种朴素的经验论，且从未背离其普遍原则。在康德哲学的二元论里，一个方面依然是知觉和反思着知觉的知性的世界。康德虽然宣称这个世界是一个现象世界，但这只不过是一个单纯的说辞，一个纯粹形式化的规定，因为其源泉、内涵和观察方式仍然保持不变。反之，另一个方面是一个独立的、自己把握着自己的思维，即自由原则，这是康德哲学和旧的普[146] 通形而上学所共有的，但它已经清空了全部内容，并且不可能为自己重新创造出什么内容。这种思维在这里叫作理性，但被剥夺了任何规定和任何权威。康德哲学带来的主要影响，就是让人们重新意识到这个绝对的内在性，后者由于其抽象性的缘故，虽然不能从自身发展出任何规定，既不能产生出知识，也不能产生出道德法则，但拒不接受和认可任何具有外在性特征的东西。理性的独立性原则，理性的内在的绝对独立性，从现在起必须被看作哲学的普遍原则，被看作我们这个时代的信念之一。

(1) The Critical philosophy has one great negative merit. It has brought home the conviction that the categories of understanding are finite in their range, and that any cognitive process confined within their pale falls short of the truth. But Kant had only a sight of half the truth. He explained the finite nature of the categories to mean that they were subjective only, valid only for our thought, from which the thing-in-itself was divided by an impassable gulf. In fact, however, it is not because they are subjective that the categories are finite: they are finite by their very nature, and it is on their own selves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude. Kant however holds that what we think is false, because it is we who think it. A further deficiency in the system is that it gives only a historical description of thought, and a mere enumeration of the factors of consciousness. The enumeration is in the main correct: but not a word touches upon the necessity of what is thus empirically colligated. The observations made on the various stages of consciousness culminant in the summary statement that the content of all we are acquainted with is only an appearance. And as it is true at least that all finite thinking is concerned with appearances, so far the conclusion is justified. This stage of ‘appearance’ however — the phenomenal world — is not the terminus of thought: there is another and a higher region. But that region was to the Kantian philosophy an inaccessible ‘other world’.

[附释1]批判哲学有一个否定意义上的重大贡献，即它使人确信，知性规定属于有限性，因此那种活动于知性规定内部的知识不可能达到真理。与此同时，这种哲学的片面性在于把那些知性规定的有限性归咎为它们仅仅属于我们的主观思维，而对这种思维而言，自在之物应当永远是一个绝对的彼岸。但实际上，知性规定的有限性并不是基于它们的主观性，毋宁说，它们自在地就是有限的，它们的有限性必须在它们自身那里得到揭示。反之在康德看来，正因为我们思考着某个东西，所以这个东西是虚假的。——这种哲学的进一步的缺陷，就是仅仅以历史学的方式描述思维，仅仅列举出意识的各个环节。这种列举虽然大体上是正确的，但根本没有涉及那些通过经验的方式而把握的东西的必然性。康德在考察意识的不同层次之后，说出这样一个结论：我们所知道的东西的内容仅仅是现象。就有限的思维确实只是和现象打交道而言，我们不妨认可这个结论。然[147]而现象这个层次并不意味着万事大吉，毋宁说还有一个更高远的国度，而这个国度对于康德哲学来说确实是一个遥不可及的彼岸。

(2) After all it was only formally that the Kantian system established the principle that thought is spontaneous and self-determining. Into details of the manner and the extent of this self-determination of thought, Kant never went. It was Fichte who first noticed the omission; and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for the categories, endeavoured really to supply something of the kind. With Fichte, the ‘Ego’ is the starting-point in the philosophical development: and the outcome of its action is supposed to be visible in the categories. But in Fichte the ‘Ego’ is not really presented as a free, spontaneous energy; it is supposed to receive its first excitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock the ‘Ego’ will, it is assumed, react, and only through this reaction does it first become conscious of itself. Meanwhile, the nature of the impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale: and the ‘Ego’, with something else always confronting it, is weighted with a condition. Fichte, in consequence, never advanced beyond Kant’s conclusion, that the finite only is knowable, while the infinite transcends the range of thought. What Kant calls the thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the impulse from without — that abstraction of something else than ‘I’, not otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non-Ego in general. The ‘I’ is thus looked at as standing in essential relation with the not-I, through which its act of self-determination is first awakened. And in this manner the ‘I’ is but the continuous act of self-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom, because with the surcease of the impulse the ‘I’, whose being is its action, would also cease to be. Nor is the content produced by the action of the ‘I’ at all different from the ordinary content of experience, except by the supplementary remark, that this content is mere appearance.

[附释2]康德哲学起初仅仅提出一个形式化的原则，即思维应当从自身出发自己规定自己。至于思维如何以及在何等限度内自己规定自己，康德却没有给出任何指示。与此相反，费希特认识到了这个缺陷，他在明确要求对范畴进行演绎时，也尝试着真正提供这样一个演绎。费希特把自我当作哲学发展的出发点，而范畴应当作为自我的活动的结果体现出来。现在的问题是，自我看起来并不是一个真正自由的和自发的活动，因为据说自我首先是由一个外部的阻碍(AnstoB)所激励的；自我应当对这个阻碍作出反应，而只有通过这个反应，它才能够达到自我意识。——在这里，阻碍在本性上始终是一个未知的外物，自我始终是一个有条件的、与一个他者相对立的东西。就此而言，费希特同样止步于康德哲学的那个结论，即我们只能认识有限者，至于无限者则是已经超越了思维。康德所说的“自在之物"在费希特那里变成了"外部的阻碍",这个东西是自我的他者，其唯一具有的规定就是作为否定者或一般意义上的非我而存在着。相应地，自我被看作与非我相关联，并且是在后者的激励下才作出自身规定的活动，也就是说，自我仅仅是一种持续不断地从阻碍那里解脱出来的活动，同时又不能达到真正的解脱，因为自我的存在仅仅是自我的活动，因此假若不再有阻碍，那么自我本身也将不再存在。进而言之，自我的活动所产生出来的内容无非是日常的经验内容，只不过补充了一点，即这个活动仅仅是现象。